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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
January 6, 1983 Conference 





Cert to CA6 (Keith, Jones) (Mer-
ritt, dissenting) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Whether the CA6 erred in concluding that resps 
had established a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis 
of hand·icap by demonstrating that a proposed reduction in the 
number of hospital days covered by the State's Medicaid program 
would have a more severe impact on handicapped than on non-
handicapped persons. 




2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Tennessee Medicaid recipi-
' 
ents challenged Tennessee's decision to 'reduce tha1 number of 
''I 
inpatient hospital days the program provides in a fiscal year to 
each eligible recipient from 20 to 14. They claimed that the 
proposed reduction violated §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U.S.C. §794, and regulations promulgated thereunder, because it 
had a disparate impact on handicapped individuals. 
The state conceded that the change would have a greater 
impact on handicapped individuals, since handicapped individuals 
used inpatient hospital services more than non-handicapped indi-
viduals. It urged, however, that that impact did not constitute 
the type of "disparate impact" required to establish a violation 
of §504. 
The DC (Morton) concluded that the respondents had not es-
tablished a prima facie case of a violation of §504. It found 
the statistics provided by resps insufficient to support a find-
ing of disparate impact. Even if the statistics were sufficient, 
the DC concluded that the disparate impact they demonstrated was 
not of the type proscribed by §504. The resps' evidence demon-
strated an adverse impact on the effectiveness of those services. 
Section 504, however, requires only equal access to services. 
The CA6 reversed. It found the DC's dismissal of resps' 
statistics an improper confusion of a prima facie case with the 
ultimate outcome of the case. The regulations require that 
handicapped persons be given an equal opportunity to succeed at 
the goal of the program and that the program be run in a manner 
that does not impair its objectives. The objectives of the Med-
r' 
I 
icaid program are to provide the best care and treatment the 
allotted funds _ can provide. Thus, by demonstrati11g that the 
''I 
state's proposed change would disproportionately affect the abil-
ity of handicapped individuals to receive that care, resps' sta-
tistics demonstrated the kind of inequality sought to be prevent-
ed by §504. 
The CA6 noted that establishing a prima facie case was only 
a first step. It requires the state to present some evidence 
that its decision is a rational one. Here, resps had come for-
ward with an alternative method of achieving the state's desired 
cost savings that would alleviate the burden on handicapped per-
sons. The method, as explained by the CA6, was to limit the 
total number of visits per annum, rather than the number of days 
of care. 1 The CA6 held that the State should be required to 
provide a substantial justification for its choice of a reduction 
in inpatient hospital days when equal savings could be achieved 
by limiting the number of admissions. One such justification 
might be that the alternative proposal would not yield the same 
amount of cost savings achieved by the State's per day reduction. 
Judge Merritt dissented. In his view, the majority improp-
erly has read the statute as requiring affirmative action or 
equality of results. All that §504 requires is equality of ac-
1Resps indicate that the CA6 was confused about their proposal, 
although that confusion should have no effect on this Court's 
consideration of the case. Their proposal was to limit the 
number of days of hospital coverage on a per-stay basis, without 




3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs contend first that the fA6 erred in 
'I 
concluding that a prima facie violation of §504 could be estab-
lished by demonstrating disparate "impact" or "effects". Even if 
the CA6 was correct in that conclusion, it erred in determining 
that equality of results, not just of access, is required by 
§ 504. 
Resps urge that the case is not ripe for review. The CA6 
has made no finding of discrimination. On remand, the State may 
rebut the prima facie case established by resps' statistics. 
Resps also insist that the State has not before argued that the 
"disparate impact" standard was inappropriate for determining 
whether a prima facie violation of §504 had been established. It 
has urged only that the disparate impact which they conceded to 
be present did not establish discrimination under §504. Finally, 
resps urge that the CA6 was correct. Its decision that resps had 
established a prima facie violation is consistent with the regu-
lations promulgated under the statute and with decisions of other 
circuits that have considered similar claims. 
4. DISCUSSION: In Guardians Association v. Civil Service 
Commission of New York, 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983), five Justices 
found that a violation of Title VI could be established by demon-
strating that a challenged examination had a disparate impact on 
minorities. Section 504 is modeled after Title VI. It therefore 
seems reasonable to assume that a violation of §504 also can be 
established by demonstrating that a challenged practice or change 
would have a disparate impact on handicapped persons. 
. ' 
- .. , The proper application of the disparate impact standard to a 
§504 violation is not clear. The CA6 relied pr i.ip1arily on 
§84.4(4) of the regulations to find that the dispar~le impact of 
the proposed change was proscribed by §504. Section 84.4(4) 
prohibits "criteria or methods of administration . (i) that 
have the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to 
discrimination on the basis of handicap, ( i i) that have the pur-
pose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accom-
plishment of the objectives of the recipient's program with re-
spect to handicapped persons". The problem with reading resps' 
statistics to demonstrate discrimination on the basis of handicap 
is that if the statistics are correct, any cutback on available 
hospitalization would impact handicapped persons more severely 
than non-handicapped persons. And, as the Judge Merritt points 
out in dissent, although it may be true that the State could have 
devised a different scheme to save money that would not have had 
the same disparate effect on the handicapped persons included in 
resps' studies, it would seem that any reduction in funding or 
services, however effected, would have a disparate effect on some 
class of handicapped patients. If the State limited the number 
of trips to the hospital during the year rather than the number 
of total days covered, the change would fall hardest on the class 
of patients who must come to the hospital for treatment often. 
It seems pointless to force the State to justify its choice of a 
cost-cutting method that has a disparate impact on handicapped 
persons if any of its choices necessarily would have a greater 




On the other hand, as resps point out, the CA6 has not made 
a finding of discrimination. It has held only that resps have 
made out a prima facie case. In doing so, it is coJ sistent with 
other courts of appeals that have recognized that a prima facie 
case could be established by demonstrating that a change in serv-
ices would impose a greater burden on handicapped than on non-
handicapped persons. See NAACP v. The Medical Center, 657 F.2d 
1322 (CA3 1981). Cf. Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (CA2 1980) 
(Title VI). None of those courts has made an ultimate finding of 
discrimination on the basis of the plaintiffs' showing. Similar-
ly, in this case, the State should have little trouble rebutting 
resps' prima facie case. Requiring a State to do so does not 
impose a heavy burden on the State; presumably it can be done on 
a motion for summary judgment. 
Assuming that the CA6 is correct that a prima facie case can 
be established by the use of statistics indicating that a pro-
posed change in Medicaid services impacts handicapped persons 
more severely than non-handicapped persons, the decision of the 
CA6 involves simply the application of that principle to the 
facts of this case. Even if the CA6 is not correct, resps appear 
to be correct that petrs did not challenge use of the disparate 
impact test below. There is a strong likelihood that the resps 
will not prevail ultimately. Thus, there is little reason for 
this Court to review the decision at this juncture. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
December 12, 1983 Taylor opn in petn 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
LAMAR ALEXANDER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 
OF TENNESSEE, ET AL. v. ROSIER JENNINGS ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
No. 83-727. Decided January-, 1984 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting from denial of certiorari. 
The State of Tennessee, represented in this lawsuit by 
petitioner, restructured _l)o.rt!Q._ns o.f...tt§.!iedicaid Plan in re-
sponse to budgetary constraints. One c1iange }llade by the 
state was to reduce the number of hospital days covered by 
Medicaid from to 14 in any one year. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that such an action was a 
prima facie violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U. S. C. § 794, because statistical evidence introduced in the 
District Court by respondents showed that a larger percent-
age of handicapped patients than of nonhandicapped patients 
would be affected by the change in the number of hospital 
days covered by the Plan. 
More than one aspect of the decision of the Court of A -
peals seems to me quit aebatable. ast term m Guardians 
Association v. Civil Servtce ommission of New York, --
U. S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), the Court attempted to 
settle the question of whether a disparate adverse impact 
theory is ever appropriate to establish a violation of Title VI, 
42 U.S. C. §2000d, et seq., the statutory provision which 
prohibits discrimination on account of race or national origin 
in federally funded programs. 1 I continue to adhere to my 
1 In Guardians Association seven members of the Court concluded that 
a violation of Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent. 103 
S. Ct. 3221, 3236 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined by the CHIEF JUSTICE); 
id., at 3237 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring); id., at 3237-3239 (O'CONNOR, J., 
concurring); id., at 3249, 3253 (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined by Jus-
TICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN). Two members of the Court concluded 
2 · ALEXANDER v. JENNINGS 
view that that theory is inapplicable to cases alleging racial 
and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VI, and 
I would also hold that it is inapplicable to cases alleging 
handicap discrimination in violation of § 504, a statute which 
is modeled after Title VI. SeeS. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess. 6390-6391, reprinted in 1974 U. S. Code Cong. & 
Ad. News 6373. 
The operative lan age of § 504 provides that no handi-
capped individual sha solely by reason of his handicap, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance .... " 29 U. S. C. 
§ 794. This doe t seem to me to be the language of ~s­
pa!ate im_pact." The Court o ppeals relied on ecisions 
relating to Title VI, and to the regulations promulgated 
under § 504, describing the latter as specifically forbidding 
"the use of federal funds for programs which have discrimina-
tory effects against the handicapped." 715 F. 2d 1036, 1041. 
Even if I believed that those regulations, set forth in the 
margin, 2 could validly proscribe conduct beyond that which 
that a violation of Title VI may be established by proof of discriminatory 
impact alone, i d., at 3222-3227 (WHITE, J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court); id., at 3239-3244 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), but one of those two 
concluded that only noncompensatory relief could be awarded for such a 
violation. !d., at 3232-3235 (WHITE, J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court). Finally, three members of the Court concluded that a violation of 
the regulations promulgated under Title VI may be established by proof of 
discriminatory impact. !d., at 3253-3255 (STEVENS, J ., dissenting, joined 
by JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN). 
2 45 CFR 84.4 (1983), provides in relevant part: 
§ 84.4 Discrimination prohibited. 
(a) General. No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handi-
cap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or other-
wise be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity which 
receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance. 
(b)(4) A recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other ar-
rangements , utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the 
~' ' 
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§ 504 itself proscribes, I do not believe that they support the 
result reached by the Court of Appeals in this case. I do not 
believe that Tennessee's decision to reduce spending across 
the board on a broadly available program of medical benefits 
is impermissible under either the statute or its regulations. 
1 
It is undisputed that Tennessee proposed to reduce the 
number of inpatient hospital days from 20 to 14 days per year 
solely because of the state's need to implement budget cuts. 3 
To establis that Tennessee s facia y neu ra proposal none-
theless would have a disparate impact on handicapped 
individuals, respondents produced evidence showing that for 
fiscal year 1979-1980, the percentage of handicapped recipi-
ents who would not be served by the proposed 14 days of 
inpatient care was almost four times greater than the per-
centage of nonhandicapped recipients who would not be 
served by 14 days. 518 F. Supp. 877, 880-881. 
Given their special medical needs, however, it is not sur-
prising that respondents' statistics indicate that handicapped 
individuals as a class will require more hospital days than will 
nonhandicapped individuals to order to maintain their health. 
Yet in my view the state has no statutory obligation to 
ensure that its Medicaid program is equally effective for 
handicapped and nonhandicapped recipients so long as its 
program is equally accessible to both groups. In analyzing 
effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the 
basis of handicap, (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or 
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's 
program with respect to handicapped persons, or (iii) that perpetuate the 
discrimination of another recipient if both recipients are subject to common 
administrative control or are agencies of the same State. 
a As the Sixth Circuit recognized: 
"The evidence presented showed that the Medicaid program would have 
required $42,000,000 additional dollars to maintain the same level of serv-
ices during fiscal year 1980-81 as were provided in fiscal year 1979-80. 
Since the state of Tennessee is prohibited by statute from deficit spending 
in its Medicaid program, it must provide services within the means granted 
by its General Assembly." 715 F. 2d 1036, 1044 (1983). 
4 ALEXANDER v. JENNINGS 
respondents' statistics, the District Court correctly noted 
that in this case the "alleged problem is not with access, but 
with the end result. . . . [N]either the statute nor the ac-
companying regulations require a program to achieve identi-
cal results for handicapped and nonhandicapped persons." 
!d., at 883. The Sixth Circuit majority rejected the District 
Court's view of the Act, stating that the Act's "objective is to 
afford the best cure, therapy, or preventative treatment that 
the allotted funds can provide." 715 F. 2d, at 1043 n. 8. 
Thus a statute designed only to assure equal access for the 
handicapped to all federally funded programs has been con-
verted by the Court of Appeals into a statute requiring the 
state to take affirmative action to ensure that whatever funds 
the state allots maximize the medical benefit to the 
handicapped. 
I believe that such an interpretation fundamentally miscon- I /] 
strues Congress's purpose in passing the Rehabilitation Act. V ( 
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 
410-411 (1979), we distinguished even-handed treatment of 
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, action which the 
Act does require, from affirmative action to accommodate the 
special needs of the handicapped, action which the Act does 
not require. See also Pennhurst State School v. 
Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 27 (1981). The regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act state specifically 
that a federally funded program is not "required to produce 
the identical result or level of achievement for handicapped 
and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handicapped 
persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result." 45 
CFR § 84.4(b)(2) (1983). Undoubtedly Tennessee can satisfy 
that objective by providing that Medicaid will pay for the 
same number of inpatient hospital days for handicapped as 
for nonhandicapped individuals; in my view it need not totally 
defer to the special needs of the handicapped in setting the 
number of hospital days its Medicaid program will cover. 
. ALEXANDER v. JENNINGS 5 
Respondents contend that even if the Sixth Circuit were 
wrong in concluding that a prima facie case had been estab-
lished, review by this Court is premature given the fact that 
no finding of ultimate discrimination has yet been made. 
But it is entirely unclear just what the state could show on 
remand, if anything, to avoid a finding of discrimination. In 
the words of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, 
"[c]ombining an equality of results standard with the dispar-
ate impact test means the plaintiff always wins." 715 F. 2d 
1047, 1049 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
I dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in this case. 
s~~ 
k~ · 
" To: The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 
Justice White 
Jus tic~ Marshall 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
LAMAR ALEXANDER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 
OF TENNESSEE, ET AL. v. ROSIER JENNINGS ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
No. 83-727. Decided February-, 1984 I 
JusTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR 
joins, dissenting from denial of certiorari. 
The State of Tennessee, represented in this lawsuit by 
petitioner, restructured portions of its Medicaid Plan in re-
sponse to budgetary constraints. One change made by the 
state was to reduce the number of hospital days covered by 
Medicaid from 20 to 14 in any one year. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit held that such an action was a 
prima facie violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 
U. S. C. § 794, because statistical evidence introduced in the 
District Court by respondents showed that a larger percent-
age of handicapped patients than of nonhandicapped patients 
would be affected by the change in the number of hospital 
days covered by the Plan. 
More than one aspect of the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals seems to me quite debatable. Last term in Guardians 
Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York,--
U. S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983), the Court attempted to 
settle the question of whether a disparate adverse impact 
theory is ever appropriate to establish a violation of Title VI, 
42 U.S. C. §2000d, et seq., the statutory provision which 
prohibits discrimination on account of race or national origin 
in federally funded programs. 1 I continue to adhere to my 
1 In Guardians Association seven members of the Court concluded that 
a violation of Title VI itself requires proof of discriminatory intent. 103 
S. Ct. 3221, 3236 (POWELL, J., concurring, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE); 
id., at 3237 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring); id., at 3237-3239 (O'CONNOR, J ., 
concurring); id., at 3249, 3253 (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined by BREN-
•• ' .. 
I . 
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view that that theory is inapplicable to cases alleging racial 
and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VI, and 
I would also hold that it is inapplicable to cases alleging 
handicap discrimination in violation of § 504, a statute which 
is modeled after Title VI. SeeS. Rep. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess. 6390-6391, reprinted in 1974 U. S. Code Cong. & 
Ad. News 6373. 
The operative language of § 504 provides that no handi-
capped individual shall "solely by reason of his handicap, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving federal financial assistance .... " 29 U. S. C. 
§ 794. This does not seem to me to be the language of "dis-
parate impact." The Court of Appeals relied on decisions re-
lating to Title VI, and to the regulations promulgated under 
§ 504, describing the latter as specifically forbidding "the use 
of federal funds for programs which have discriminatory ef-
fects against the handicapped." 715 F. 2d 1036, 1041. Even 
if I believed that those regulations, set forth in the margin, 2 
NAN and BLACKMUN, JJ.) . Two members of the Court concluded that a 
violation of Title VI may be established by proof of discriminatory impact 
alone, id. , at 3222-3227 (WHITE, J., announcing the judgment of the 
Court); id. , at 3239-3244 (MARSHALL, J. , dissenting) , but one of those two 
concluded that only noncompensatory relief could be awarded for such a 
violation. !d., at 3232-3235 (WHITE, J. , announcing the judgment of the 
Court). Finally, three members of the Court concluded that a violation of 
the regulations promulgated under Title VI may be established by proof of 
discriminatory impact. !d., at 3253-3255 (STEVENS, J., dissenting, joined 
by BRENNAN and BLACKMUN, JJ.). 
2 45 CFR 84.4 (1983), provides in relevant part: 
§ 84.4 Discrimination prohibited. 
(a) General. No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handi-
cap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or other-
wise be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity which 
receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance. · 
(b)(4) A recipient may not, directly or through contractual or other ar-
rangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the 
' . 
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could validly proscribe conduct beyond that which § 504 itself 
proscribes, I do not believe that they support the result 
reached by the Court of Appeals in this case. I do not be-
lieve that Tennessee's decision to reduce spending across the 
board on a broadly available program of medical benefits is 
impermissible under either the statute or its regulations. 
It is undisputed that Tennessee proposed to reduce the 
number of inpatient hospital days from 20 to 14 days per year 
solely because of the state's need to implement budget cuts. 3 
To establish that Tennessee's facially neutral proposal none-
theless would have a disparate impact on handicapped indi-
viduals, respondents produced evidence showing that for fis-
cal year 1979-1980, the percentage of handicapped recipients 
who would not be served by the proposed 14 days of inpatient 
care was almost four times greater than the percentage of 
nonhandicapped recipients who would not be served by 14 
days. 518 F. Supp. 877, 880-881. 
Given their special medical needs, however, it is not sur-
prising that respondents' statistics indicate that handicapped 
individuals as a class will require more hospital days than will 
nonhandicapped individuals to order to maintain their health. 
Yet in my view the state has no statutory obligation to en-
sure that its Medicaid program is equally effective for handi-
capped and nonhandicapped recipients so long as its program 
effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the 
basis of handicap, (ii) that have the purpose or effect of defeating or 
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's 
program with respect to handicapped persons, or (iii) that perpetuate the 
discrimination of another recipient if both recipients are subject to common 
administrative control or are agencies of the same State. 
3 As the Sixth Circuit recognized: 
"The evidence presented showed that the Medicaid program would have 
required $42,000,000 additional dollars to maintain the same level of serv-
ices during fiscal year i980-81 as were provided in fiscal year 1979-80. 
Since the state of Tennessee is prohibited by statute from deficit spending 
in its Medicaid program, it must provide services within the means granted 
by its General Assembly." 715 F . 2d 1036, 1044 (1983). 
' -
4 ALEXANDER v. JENNINGS 
is equally accessible to both groups. In analyzing respond-
ents' statistics, the District Court correctly noted that in this 
case the "alleged problem is not with access, but with the end 
result .... [N]either the statute nor the accompanying regu-
lations require a program to achieve identical results for 
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons." Id., at 883. 
The Sixth Circuit majority rejected the District Court's view 
of the Act, stating that the Act's "objective is to afford the 
best cure, therapy, or preventative treatment that the allot-
ted funds can provide." 715 F. 2d, at 1043, n. 8. Thus a 
statute designed only to assure equal access for the handi-
capped to all federally funded programs has been converted 
by the Court of Appeals into a statute requiring the state to 
take affirmative action to ensure that whatever funds the 
state allots maximize the medical benefit to the handicapped. 
I believe that such an interpretation fundamentally miscon-
strues Congress's purpose in passing the Rehabilitation Act. 
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 
410-411 (1979), we distinguished even-handed treatment of 
handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, action which the 
Act does require, from affirmative action to accommodate 
the special needs of the handicapped, action which the Act 
does not require. See also Pennhurst State School v. Hal-
derman, 451 U. S. 1, 27 (1981). The regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act state specifically 
that a federally funded program is not "required to produce 
the identical result or level of achievement for handicapped 
and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handicapped 
persons equal opportunity to obtain the same result." 45 
CFR § 84.4(b)(2) (1983). Undoubtedly Tennessee can satisfy 
that objective by providing that Medicaid will pay for the 
same number of inpatient hospital days for handicapped as 
for nonhandicapped individuals; in my view it need not totally 
defer to the special needs of the handicapped in setting the 
number of hospital days its Medicaid program will cover. 
' ,. 
I . 
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Respondents contend that even if the Sixth Circuit were 
wrong in concluding that a prima facie case had been estab-
lished, review by this Court is premature given the fact that 
no finding of ultimate discrimination has yet been made. 
But it is entirely unclear just what the state could show on 
remand, if anything, to avoid a finding of discrimination. In 
the words of the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, 
"[c]ombining an equality of results standard with the dispar-
ate impact test means the plaintiff always wins." 715 F. 2d 
1047, 1049 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
I dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in this case. 
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No. 83-727 
ABSENT NOT VOTING 
LFP/djb 8/16/84 
No. 83-727, Alexander, Governor of Tennessee v. Jennings, et al. 
Memorandum for the File 
' 'I ,., 
This is a summary memorandum on the basis of a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. 
As I will need a bench memo in this case, I will do little 
more now than identify the question and indicate briefly the 
arguments of the parties. The case involves the interpretation 
of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and regulations promulgated 
under it. Section 504 provides in relevant part: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped indivi-
dual *** shall, solely by reason of his handicap, 
be excluded from the participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance***." 
The question actually presented by this case is whether 
Tennessee's fourteen day limit on Medicaid coverage for in-patient 
hospital care has a disparate impact on the handicapped so as to 
constitute a prima facie violation of § 504. (See below for the 
Tennessee provision). The petition for cert presents, as a separate 
and antecedent question) whether a "disparate impact or effects test" 
is appropriate to determine a violation of § 504 and regulations 
thereunder. But this issue was not argued or decided by either of 
~. 
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the courts below. The SG' s amicus brief states that '! he assumes 
for purposes of this case that a showing of "disparate effects" 
could - in a proper case - constitute a prima facie violation. 
The SG's "assumption" in this respect includes both the possibility 
that§ 504 itself may require "disparate effects", or that the 
numerous agency regulations (more than 24 in all!) under§ 504 
prohibit states from establishing criteria that have the "purpose 
or effect" of discriminating against the handicapped. 
The SG therefore addresses only whether the Tennessee plan 
does have a disparate impact or effect, and argues that it does 
not. The SG bases his argument primarily on the fact that Tennessee's 
14-day limitation on hospital care provides identical benefits for 
all individuals - whether handicapped or not - who are eligible for ,...____---, 
Medicaid. 
Tennessee's Action 
L:J Medica.e, ' of course, is a joint federal-state program under 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act. Because of the seriously 
adverse effect on Tennessee's budget of the ever increasing cost 
of Medicaid, the state adopted changes in its program - to go into 
effect August 15, 1980 - that would reduce the number of in-patient 
hospital days provided in a fiscal year to each eligible recipient 
from 20 to 14. This suit was instituted by a class of handicapped 
No. 83-727 3. 
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Medicaid recipients to enjoin the proposed reduction. The state's 
brief says that the "Tennessee Medicaid program faced a fiscal 
crisis; that the General Assembly had appropriated in combined 
state and federal funds $388,000,000, an increase of some 
$26,000,000 over the preceding year. Respondents, plaintiffs in 
the law suit, claimed that the effect of the change is to discrimi-
nate unlawfully against the handicapped recipients. Statistical 
evidence showed that of the total number of Medicaid recipients who 
used hospital care 92 per cent of the non-handicapped would have 
been fully served by 14 days of coverage, whereas only 72.6 per cent 
of the handicapped would have been fully served. Thus, 27.4 of the 
handicapped users of this service, as opposed to 7.8 per cent of 
the non-handicapped users, required some hospitalization for which 
they would not be reimbursed under the 14 day limit. 
The Decisions Below 
The DC rejected respondent's argument. It held that the 
proportionately greater hospital use by handicapped Medicaid 
claimants was not necessarily attributable to their handicaps; 
that the plan was neutral on its face, applying alike to handi-
capped and non-handicapped, and that the statistical disparity 
"did not amount to discrimination" under § 504. 
No. 83-727 4. 
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On appeal, CA 6 held that respondent 1 had shown a disparate 
impact, and therefore established a prima facie case. The case 
therefore was remanded to determine whether the state could rebut 
the prima facie case. 
Arguments of the Parties 
Since its inception in 1969, Tennessee had provided 20 days 
of in-patient hospital care per fiscal year. Apparently it is 
agreed that neither the statute nor the regulations require state 
programs to provide any specific number of days so long as the 
limit is reasonable "in amount, duration, and scope." The number 
of in-patient hospital days covered varies from state to state 
depending on several factors, including what other services are 
provided. Most states do provide more than 14 days. One table 
suggests that only Idaho has as few as 14. 
The state's principal argument is that Congress intended to 
prohibit only ''intentional" discrimination when it inacted § 504, 
an intent evident from the language of § 504 that is "almost 
identical to Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964" (prohibiting 
discrimination against minorities in federally funded programs). 
See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Daronne, (my decision last Term). 
Since the 14 day limit is applied even-handedly to all Medicaid 
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claimants, there is no discrimination. 
, I 
It is argued that a 
"contrary ruling would attribute to Congress the unlikely intent 
to afford greater protection to the handicapped under § 504 than 
minorities are provided under Title VI". 
The SG makes a somewhat more sophisticated argument, although 
basically it agrees with the state that the "disparate" impact or 
effect argument is "legally insufficient because the state plan 
offers the same benefits to all Medicaid eligibles, handicapped 
and non-handicapped alike." The Court of Appeals' view to the con-
trary (2-1), that the handicapped are affected "more harshly than 
others", rests on the assumption that the "benefit Tennessee is 
conferring is not a fixed amount of health services, but the 
satisfaction of health needs." That is, CA 6's view assumes that 
because the handicapped may need more hospitalization than non-
handicapped, the effect of equal treatment is itself discriminatory. 
The respondents, of course, take a very different view. Their 
brief repeatedly states that it was conceded by Tennessee, and by 
both of the courts below, "that § 504 applied to practices which 
have the effect of discriminating against the handicapped." Again, 
respondents state that "petitioners again conceded (before CA 6) 
that§ 504 applied to practices with a discriminatory effect". 
See p. 2-4 of Brief. 
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Respondents speaking of concessions, apparently ' concede 
that the statutory language does not support their view: "Whether 
§ 504 applies to practices with a discriminatory effect cannot be 
resolved by reference to statutory language." But 24 federal 
agencies "have issued regulations under § 504 which apply 
it to practices with a discriminatory effect", and respondents 
cite my opinion in Consolidated Rail as requiring "particular 
deference" to these regulations. Finally, respondents argue: 
"Even if § 504 itself forbids only practices 
with a discriminatory purpose, the discrimina-
tory effect regulations are nonetheless valid 
as reasonably related to the statute." 
Citing Guardian Association v. Civil Service Commission (the case 
in which the Court split into several factions, including Justice 
Stevens' view that the regulations controlled regardless of what 
the statute provides). 
* * * 
I am not at rest. The state's argument that the statute leaves 
the number of days of care for each state to decide, so long as the 
number is reasonable, is rather persuasive. There is nothing in the 
statute that supports respondents, and it can be argued that the 
language of the statute itself controls this case - a possibility that 
No. 83-727 7. 
' respondents concede. If one agrees with this view, ] t would be diffi-
cult for me to conclude that agency regulations can add a substantive 
provision to a statute. It probably is quite true that even in states 
that provide more than 14 days of care (e.g. Tennessee prior to the 
1980 change), disabled persons more frequently requires additional days 
than non-disabled persons. Yet, neither the statute nor the regu-
lations (to the extent I am familiar with them) require any more 
than that the care be "reasonable". Query whether one can say that 
20 is reasonable and 14 is not? I will be interested in my clerk's 






To: Mr. Justice Powell September 6, 1984 
From: Lee 
No. 83-727, Alexander v. Choate 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Does Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibit actions 
having a ~isparate impact" upon handicapped persons? 
II. If Sections 504 does prohibit actions having a "disparate 
impact," have the plaintiffs shown such an impact? 
BACKGROUND 
I. Statutory Background 
Section 504 of the Rehablitation Act of 1973 provides in 
pertinent part: 
};' .. 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(7} qf this 
title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance or under any program or activity conducted 
by any Executive agency or by the Untied States Postal 
Service. 
29 u.s.c. §794. 
"'• 
The United States Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, a principal 
adopted V:.egulations 
source of federal financial assistance, 
implementing section 504 in 1977. The 
regulations address ~~r ~nation against the handicapped both 
.0 
1n general terms an in the conte~ of specific t~es of 
programs. Section 84.52(a}, which is one of the specific 
regulations dealing with "Health, Welfare, and Social Services," 
provides as follows: 
In providing vheal th, ~elf are, 
or benefits, a recipient may 
handicap: ~ 
/ h . 1 . or ot er soc1a serv1ces 
not, on the basis of 
(1} Deny a qualified handicapped person these 
benefits or services; 
(2} Afford a qualified handicapped person an 
opportunity to receive benefits or services that is not 
equal to that offered to nonhandicapped persons; 
(3} Provide a qualified handicapped person with 
benefits or services that are not as effective (as 
defined in §84.4(b}} as the benefits or services 
provided to others; 
(4} Provide benefits or services in a manner that 
limits or has the effect of limiting the participation 
of qualified handicapped persons; or 
(5} Provide different or separate benefits or 
services to handicapped persons except where neccesary 
to provide qualified handicapped persons with benefits 
and services that are as effective as those provided to 
others. 
~. 
45 C.F.R. §84.52(a). 
il 
The requirement that handicapped persons Be provided ----------
with benefits that are as "effective" as those provided to others 
--======- --~
is modified by §84. 4 (b) of the regulations, w.Meh provides in 
pertinent part: 
[A]ids, benefits, and services, to be equally 
effective, are not required to produce the identical 
result or level of acheivement for handicapped persons, 
but mu t aff rd handicap ed persons equal opportunity 
to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, to 
reach the same level of acheivement, in the most 
integrated setting appropriate to the person's needs. 
45 C.F.R. §84.4(b) (2). 
II. Factual Background 
The Tennessee~edicaid Program~is a comprehensive scheme 
designed to provide health care to indigent citizens. See T.C.A. 
§14-23-101, et. seq. The program, which is funded jointly by the 
------~ 
State of Tennessee and the federal government, provides 
J } , , --assistance to eligible individuals needing inpatient hospital 
care, physician services, prescription drugs, nursing home care, 
laboratory services, and numerous outpatient clinical services. 
The program's budget in fiscal year 1979-1980 was approximately 
$365 million, 70 percent of which came from the federal 
government. 
Due to the rising cost of health care, Medicaid 
program officials predicted that $430 million would be needed to 
provide the same level of benefits to the same number of 
-




individuals in fiscal year 1980-1981. , Therefore', when the 
~~ 
for 1980-19lh set the ~ 
program's budget -~~- about $38~~on, state officials becam~ 
aware of the need to implement cost-cutting measures. Program 
officials decided to reduce the level of benefits for se~ 
Tennessee legislature's -- ~~------- appropriation 
services. The number of inpatient hospital days covered by 
Medicaid was reduced from 20 per fiscal year to 14 per fiscal~ 
. ~~ 
It was anticipated that th1s change alone would save the 
state almost $13 million. The proposed reduction was to become ~ 
year. 
effective on August 15, 1980. 1;:;:14 
1~./J. ,_,' .. 11 . . I > 1'-) A. The District Court's Decision lv v~ f~ ~~~~ ~ 
III. The Decisions Below 
On August 14, 1980, this action was brought in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee 
on behalf of the state's Medicaid recipients. Although all of 
the changes proposed by the state were challenged, by the time of 
' '-the district court's decision, the only remainin~issue was the 
..... 
validity of the proposed reduction in the number of hospital days 
covered by Medicaid. The plaintiffs contended that this change 
violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 u.s.c. 
§794, as it had a disparate impact upon handicapped persons. The 
"'- ~- ----
plaintiffs noted that if one considered only those Medicaid 
recipients who needed at least one day of inpatient hospital care 
in fiscal year 1979-1980, 27.7 percent the "handicapped" 
individuals needed more than fourteen days of inpatient care. In 
contrast, only 7.8 percent of the "non-handicapped" persons 
.Jo 
I 




The d~urt assumed that Section 504 applied to ;(\ C 
ll ~ 1. - AY 
practices that adversely affecte~ the handicapped. Nevertheless, 
it held that the plaintiffs' Section 504 claim should be rejected 
for two reasons. First, the DC stated that although the fourteen ---------
day rule might have had an adverse impact upon handicapped 
persons in fiscal year 1979-1980, there was no reason to believe 
that it would have such an effect in future years. Second, the 
trial co~t~oncluded that Section 504 and the regulations did 
not apply to the type of adverse impact that the proposed 
' ------ ~------------------------~ 
reduction in hospital benefits might cause. The plaintiffs were 
'---------------------------------~ arguing that the hospital benefits were not as effective in 
meeting the medical needs of handicapped persons. Section 504, 
however, was never intended to ensure equality of results. The -
DC noted that this case was clearly distinguishable from those in 
which the alleged "disparate impact" amounted to an outright 
exclusion of the handicapped from the service or benefit in 
question. 
B. The Sixth Circuit's Decision~ 
C. A~ 
On appeal, a three-judge panel of 1\ t:he United Sta~ 
reversed the district 
/ 
J Ceert 
court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1983). ~~~f.r.:t 
held that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 




persons more harshly than others. Citing , NAACP v. ' The Medical 
il 
Center, Inc., 657 F2d 1981} {en bane} , tlhe CA noted 
that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 u.s.c. §2000d, requires 
only that a "plaintiff prove a disparate impact." Because the 
Rehabilitation Act was "predicated" upon Title VI, Section 504 
necessarily incorporates the same effects test. The CA further 
stated that the regulations promulgated under Section 504 
explicitly adopt a "disparate impact" test. CA6 refused to 
After deciding that Section 504 prohibits policies that 
have a disparate impact upon handicapped persons, the court of 
appeals concluded that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie 
case. The statisi tical evidence, when coupled with the expert 
medical testimony, showed that the proposed reduction would 
affect handicapped persons more harshly than non-handicapped 
individuals. Moreover, CA6 held that the state had failed to 
rebut the plaintiffs' prima facie case. Therefore, the court of 
appeals remanded the case to the district court to give the state 
an opportunity to show that there was "some substantial 
justification for the adoption of the plan with the greater 
discriminatory impact." 
V Judge Merritt dissented from the Sixth Circuit's ~ 
decision. Although he did not dispute the majority's holding 
that a disparate impact test could be used under section 504, he 
stated that such a test was appropriate only when the challenged 
action denied the handicapped an opportunity to participate. 
Section 504 was intended to secure for the handicapped equal 
access to federally funded programs, not , equal re'sul ts. The 
~~ 
majority's reasoning, the dis sent argued, ignored th'~ fact that 
Congress was aware of the distinction between "evenhanded 
treatment of qualified handicapped persons and affirmative 
efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps." 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 u.s. 397, 410 
(1979). ( ~ ~) 
DISCUSSION 
I. Disparate Impact Theory Under Section 504 
The ~ate argues that Section 504 does not prohibit the 
use of federal funds in a manner that merely has a disparate 
impact upon handicapped persons. Under its view, a recipient of '" (,.. • 
J,t~~"' 
federal funds should not be found in violation of the 
Rehabilitation Act unless it intentionally discriminates against ~ 
the handicapped. In IE:;Iiard ians Association v. Civil Service ~ 
Comm'n of New York, 103 S.Ct. 3221 (1983), seven Justices stated 
that Title VI must be construed so as to proscribe only 
purposeful discrimination. Section 504 was modeled after Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act, 1 and this Court has repeatedly noted 
the similarity between the two statutes. Consolidated Rail Corp. 
v. Darrone, 52 U.S.L.W. 4301 (1984). Therefore, it would be 
1 In its discussion of the Technical a~~larifying Amendments 
to the Rehabilitation Act in 1974, the Senate Report stated that 
"Section 504 was patterned after and is almost identical to, the 
ant1 1scrim1nat1on lan uage o sec 10n of the Civil Rights 
Acto 196 . s. Rep. No. 7, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6390-91, 
reprinted in 1974 u.s. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6373. 
Uo 
I 
perfectly logical to hold that Section ,504, 
prohibits only inte~tional discrimination. 
like Title VI, 
il 
•'\ 
The state recognizes that many of the regulations 
implementing Section 504 prohibit the use of federal funds in a 
manner l'L . "" h d' d that has a disparate 1mpact upon an 1cappe persons. 
The state reasonably argues that such regulations are invalid, ~f~~~' 
they go beyond the statute, rather than simply "furthering it." 
Therefore, the regulations do not necessarily prevent this Court 
from holding that the disparate impact theory has no 
applicability to claims brought under the Rehabilitation Act. 
Although the state's argument is plausible, both the 
district court and the Sixth Circuit assumed that a violation of 
the Rehabilitation Act could be based upon a finding of disparate 
impact. 2 Moreover, there are three other reasons why this Court 
should not hold that Section 504 and its implementing regulations 
bar only intentional discrimination: (1) the legislative history 
of the Rehabilitation Act differs from that of Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act, suggesting that the two statutes may well have 
different standards of liability; (2) the lower courts have held 
that Section 504 prohibits actions that have an adverse impact 
upon the handicapped; and (3) even if a majority of the Court 
held that Section 504 is concerned only with intentional 
discrimination, another majority probably would hold that the 
2Apparantly, at trial and 
Section 5 4 rohibited at 
dis~ upon the 
before CA6, the state conceded that 
east some actions that would~have a 
han 
. --( ~ ~ bJ ~f.,VVV 
/ ~~~ 
"effects" · at ions['{\ are nevertheless , valid. These three ~ 
---- il rv ./lA}-"" ... 
will be discussed below. ··j , c~ 
~~w(. 
considerations 
A. Legislative History of Section 504 
/]AA)f ~ 
~
Although the two statutes are nearly identical, it is ~vv 
vft~ . ..// (). ---possible that under Section 504, unlike Title VI, a plaintiff 
need not prove that the recipient had discriminatory intent. 
This seeming anomoly can be explained by the fact that the two 
statutes have entirely [different legislative ~torie~ In 
enacting Title VI, Congress intended to proscribe only those 
racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause or the Fifth Amendment. University of California Regents 
v • Bakke , 4 3 8 U • S . 2 6 5 , 2 8 7 ( 19 7 8) ( Po we 11 , J • ) • Therefore, 
Title VI prohibits only intentional racial discrimination. 
Washington v. Davis, 426 u.s. 229 (1976). Tennessee's argument 
that Section 504 adopted this same constitutional standard is 
strained because handicapped persons are not treated as 
"suspect class" and have no special constitutional protections. 
c---
Not surprisingly, the legislative history of Section 504 contains 
no references to recognized constitutional standards. 
The state's "Title VI argument" becomes even less 
persuasive when it is remembered that the Rehabilitation Act was 
passed in 1973. At that time, the agencies responsible for the 
implementation of Title VI had construed it as having adopted an 
"effects" standard. 29 Fed. Reg. 16274-16305 (1964). Because 
the critical inquiry is "what [Congress'] perception of the law 
was," Brown v. G.S.A., 425 u.s. 820, 828 (1976), it seems likely 
..... 
that Section 504 was intended to prohi~it actions having a 
;I 
disparate impact upon the handicapped. Moreover, the 'bomments of 
'--~' -----
the legislators indicate they were concerned about "unintentional 
-----------~-~~ • Senator~mpflr~y":J for example, in introducing 
the bill, stated that tne ·-Renabili tat ion Act was designed to 
eliminate the "discriminatory effect of job qualification 
procedures." 118 Cong. Rec. 525-26 (1972) (emphasis added). 
In summary, the similarity between Title VI and Section 
504 does not necessarily suggest that the latter statute is 
concerned only with intentional discrimination. The differences 
in the legislative histories of the two statutes make such a 
conclusion questionable. 
B. The Lower Courts 
It appears that all of the lower courts considering the 
issue have assumed that Section 504 prohibits actions having a 
disparate impact upon handicapped persons. In NAACP v. The 
Medical Center, 657 F. 2d 1322 @cir. 1981) (en bane) , for 
example, the Third Circuit considered a challenge by handicapped 
persons to the relocation of a medical facility. The court 
stated that under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiffs were not 
required to show intentional discrimination. 3 Nevertheless, CA3 
3The court's reasoning was dependent upon Title VI, which the 
Third Circuit interpreted as prohibiting "disparate impacts." 
After Guardians, it is questionable whether the Third Circuit 
would hold that Section 504 reaches beyond intentional 
discrimination. 
< .. 
1-f H l i 
held that the plaintiffs had not made ou ,t a prima ' facie case 
~~ 
because they failed to introduce any cred ibl~ evidence 
establishing the residential distribution of handicapped persons 
within the county. 
In Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d 
1277 ~r. 1977) , the Seventh Circuit considered an action 
brought under Section 504 on behalf of all mobility-disabled 
persons in the northeastern region of Illinois. The plaintiffs 
contended that because of their physical disabilities, they were 
unable to use the public transportation system operated by the 
two municipal defendants. Although there was no allegation that 
the defendants had intentionally discriminated against the 
handicapped, CA7 held that the plaintiffs had stated a cause of 
~ action under the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing 
regulations. The Seventh Circuit therefore gave at least 
implicit recognition to the "disparate impact" theory. 
This court obviously is not bound by any of the lower 
court decisions, including the two discussed above. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that not one court of appeals has 
held that a plaintiff under Section 504 is required to prove 
discriminatory intent. 
c. The Regulations 
Even if this Court were to hold that Section 504 
prohibits only intentional discrimination, the Sixth Circuit's 
reliance upon the "disparate impact" test would not necessarily 







reach conduct that has only a discri~inatory effect upon 
handicapped persons. For example, one of the ,·~ egulations ~ 
provides that a recipient must not provide health services "in a 
manner that limits or has the effect of limiting the -~ 
participation of qualified handicapped persons." 45 C.F.R. 
§84.52(a) (4) (emphasis added) • In fact, according to the 
Solicitor General, at least 24 federal agencies have regulations 
that incorporate the "disparate impact" test. See u.s. Brief 1-2 
n. 2. Therefore, the application of federal funds in a manner 
that has a discriminatory effect upon the handicapped may be 
prohibited, even if Section 504 is concerned only with 
intentional discrimination. 
In Guardians, Justice O'Connor persuasively argues that 
\:......_; administrative regulations incorporating an "effects" standard 
should not be upheld when the underlying statute proscribes only 
intentional discrimination. Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Service 
Comm'n of New York, 103 S.Ct. 3221, 3237 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) • She states that such regulations do not simply 
"further" the purpose of the statute; they go well beyond its 
purpose. Justice O'Connor acknowledges that administrative 
regulations are upheld when they are "reasonably related" to the 
purposes of the enabling statute. Mourning v. Family 
Publications Service, Inc., 411 u.s. 356, 369 (1973). She 
states, however, that the "effects" regulations are not 
reasonably related to the purposes of Title VI. A contrary 
holding, she warns, would give administrative agencies discretion 
to proscribe conduct that Congress did not intend to prohibit. 4 
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages . 
. 
';;<~~~;Y," .. ~ 
>. 
In his Guardians dissent, Justice $tevens disagrees with 
il 
Justice O'Connor. 103 S.Ct. at 3249 (Stevens, J., Ci)issenting). 
He argues that a regulation prohibiting disparate effects might 
be valid, even if the underlying statute proscribes only 
intentional discrimination. In support of his position, he points 
to several cases in which a regulation upheld by the Court 
prohibited conduct that was not proscribed explicitly by the 
enabling statute. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 
411 u.s. 356, 369 (1973). He also argues that City of Rome v. 
United States, 446 u.s. 156, 173-178 (1980), illustrates the 
reasonableness of the agencies' regulations. In City of Rome, 
the Court held that even if §1 of the Fifteenth Amendment 
prohibits only purposeful racial discrimination, Congress may 
implement that prohibition by banning voting practices that are 
discriminatory in effect. 5 
better 
Although it seems to me that Justice O'Connor has the 
argument,~ least five Justices believe that 
4 In a footnote, you approved of Justice O'Connor's analysis. } 
Guardians Assoc. v. Civil Service Comm'n of New York City, 103 ~~ 
s.ct at 3237 n.5 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). I 
5Justice Stevens cites Boske v. Comingore, 177 u.s. 459, 470 
(1900), for the proposition that "an administrative regulation's 
conformity to statutory authority [is] to be measured by the same 
standard as a statute's conformity to constitutional authority." 
Justice O'Connor disputes this conclusion, stating that the 
"breadth of authority granted to Congress under the enabling 
provision of the Fifteenth Amendment is not equivalent to the 
amount of discretion that an administrative agency possesses in 
implementing the provisions of a federal statute." Although this 
may well be true, Justice O'Connor does not explain adequately 




administrative regulations may prohibit, 
disparate impact, even if the enabling 
actions having a 
)I 
statute '1 does not. 
Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens' Guardians 
dissent. Justices White and Marshall, in separate opinions, 
likewise stated that such regulations were valid, as they were 
reasonably related to the statute's purpose. 103 s.ct. at 3223 
n.2 (White, J.); 103 s.ct. at 3244-3245 n.l5 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). Therefore, the Court will not be able to dispose of 
this case simply by holding that Section 504 bars only 
intentional discrimination. Because the regulations clearly 
adopt a "disparate impact" test, a majority of the Court will 
find illegal at least some actions that adversely affect the 
handicapped. 
II. What Constitutes a Disparate Impact? 
The Court probably avoid holding that the 
disparate impact theory is inapplicable to claims brought under 
Section 504. The courts below did not address this issue, and it 
is at least plausible that Congress intended the statute to 
proscibe actions that have a disparate impact upon the 
handicapped. Moreover, even if the statute is concerned only with 
intentional discrimniation, five Justices probably will find 
valid the implementing regulations, which have incorporated a 
disparate impact theory. Instead, this Court should reverse the 
Sixth Circuit on another ground. The Court should hold that the 
.L.Jo 
I 
plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the s~ate's pro~osed action 
will have ~'disparate impact" upon the handicapped. ,·! 
L - --------------
In other cases recognizing a "disparate impact" theory, 
the plaintiffs have shown that they were excluded from or denied 
/ 
access to a benefit. In ~riggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 u.s. 
424 (1971), for example, the black plaintiffs showed that they 
were excluded from certain job classifications. The handicapped ------------..... 
plaintiffs in this case, on the other hand, are not contending 
that they were denied access to Medicaid benefits. Instead, they 
are arguing that the benefits provided by the state's Medicaid 
------------------------------------program do not acheive for the handicapped the same positive 
results that are attained by the non-handicapped. The percentage 
of handicapped persons who will have all of their hospital care 
covered under the state's plan is much lower than the 
corresponding percentage for non-handicapped individuals. In 
its~ 
~. 
short, the plai~iffs are ~endl_ng that Section 504 and 
implementing regulations e~title t~l results~ 
There is a practical reason why Section 504 and its ·:e4~ .~.. 
to ~J-r. implementing regulations should not be interpreted so as 
proscribe disparate results. Although it is easy to determine 
whether a benefit has been distributed in an evenhanded fashion, 
it is often difficult to decide whether each of the recipients 
has achieved the same positive result. 6 In this case, for 
6For example, it is possible to ensure that everyone has equal 
access to a a public school. It is impossible to determine, 
however, whether all of the students obtain equally positive 





example, it is impossible to determine whether equal results 
jl 
might be obtained under various schemes because ther~ is no way 
of objectively measuring the "effectiveness" of the hospital care 
provided. This difficulty in quanitifying results probably 
explains the plaintiffs' failure to articulate a method of 
limiting hospital coverage that would not have a disparate impact 
upon the handicapped. 7 T!$ ~ ~ ~J.;:;t., a--~ 
~ ~~~
The plaintiffs' interpretation of the disparate impact~,.. 
test is not only unworkable, but it is also inconsistent with the 
legislative history of Section 504, the opinions of the lower 
courts, and the implementing regulations. Although the 
legislative history of Section 504 suggests that Congress was 
concerned about disparate effects, there is no indication that it 
intended to require equality of results. As discussed above, 
Senator Humphrey spoke out against job qualification procedures 
that have a disparate impact upon the handicapped. The other 
7Plaintiffs suggest that the state could limit the total number 
of visits per annum, rather than the number of days. There is no 
statistical evidence, however, that this plan would not have a 
"disparate impact" upon the handicapped. 
I think that the only way that the state might be able to 
ensure "equal results," as defined by the plaintiffs, would be to 
set up a scheme whereby a handicapped person is allowed to stay 
in the hospital for a greater number of days per year than a 
similarly situated nonhandicapped person. Unfortunately, if the 
goal is to acheive equally effective cures for all Medicaid 
patients, there will be insurmountable difficulties in trying to 
quantify "eff ctiveness." Assume, for example, that a person 
with emph s rna, under ideal conditions, would remain in the 
hosp1 a fo~t~ Q~:s-rflne had~neumonia. A normal person ~~~--L~ 
would only need to be hosp1talizedo~ ten days. If the state --~~ 
has only enough money to pay for thiry days of hospital care for 
both men combined, how would you allocate this amount so as to 
provide an "equally effective" cure to both patients? 
.... -, 
.1 I • 
I 
relevant legislative history similarly suggests that Congress 
~ 
intended to proscibe only those actions that have the "effect" 
of excluding handicapped persons from participation in the 
federally funded program. 
The lower court cases assuming the existence of a 
disparate impact theory have involved situations in which the 
plaintiffs allegedly were denied access to or were excluded from 
participation in the government sponsored program. In NAACP v. 
The Medical Center, 657 F. 2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane), for 
example, the handicapped plaintiffs contended that they would be 
denied access to the hospital if it were moved to a suburban 
location. Similarly, in Lloyd v. Regional Transportation 
Authority, 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), the handicapped 
plaintiffs argued that because of their physical disabilities, 
they ' were effectively excluded from the public transportation 
system operated by the defendants. In neither case did the court 
suggest that the recipient of federal funds might be required to 
ensure that handicapped persons attained the same results as non-
handicapped individuals. 
Although many of the regulations promulgated under 
Section 504 adopt a "disparate impact" test, almost all are 
concerned with the exclusion of handicapped persons from the 
federally sponsored program. One regulation, for example, 
prohibits the provision of health care benefits in a manner that 
"has the effect of limiting the participation of handicapped 
persons." See 45 C.F.R. §84.52(a) (4). Admittedly, one 




health care that is as "effective" as tha.t provided, to others. 
'I 
See 45 C.F.R. §84. 52 (a} (3}. This regulation is quai'l fied by 45 
C.F.R. §84.4(b} (2}, however, which provides: 
[A]ids, benefits, and services, to be equally 
effective, are not required to produce the identical 
result or level of acheivement for handicapped persons, 
but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity 
to obtain the same result, to gain the same benefit, to 
reach the same level of acheivement, in the most 
integrated setting appropriate to the person's needs. 
SUMMARY 
There is no support for the plaintiffs' argument that 
the proposed reduction from 20 to 14 days would violate Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The provision of fourteen days of 
hospital care, the benefit being provided by the state, may be 
less effective in meeting all of the health care needs of 
handicapped persons. Nevertheless, nothing in the legislative 
__::::::::::s .. 
history of Section 504 suggests that Congress intended to ensure 
equality of results in federally sponsored programs. Equality of 
results is an extremely costly, and in many cases unobtainable, 
goal. Congress chose to avoid the problem by proscribing only 
those actions that have th.e effect of denying handicapped persons 
access to a benefit or service. 8 
8section 504 does not proscribe all policies that exclude the 
handicapped from federally sponsored programs. In Southeastern 




Community College v. Davis, 442 u.s. 397 (1979), the Court held 
that professional schools are able to impose physical 
qualifications for admission. The Court stated that Section 504 
did not require an educational institution to modify 
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1st DRAFT ~~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES V-~....,t-i~( 
No. 83-727 ~~ 
LAMAR ALEXANDER, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE 
OF TENNESSEE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. 
HERSHEL CHOATE ET AL. 
JLe 
~ 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF ~_., 
I- ,.."-~J .... .- __., 
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT () , ,- - - ~~ 
[November-, 1984] ~ tA.JYC./ 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ ~ ~ 
In 1980, Tennessee proposed reducing the number of an-
nual days of inpatient hospital care covered by its state Med-~ J1ti.--A- LYj.. 
icaid program. The question presented is whether the effect - ~ 
upon the handicapped that this reduction will have is cogni- It /1 7 
zable under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or its im- / 
plementing regulations. We hold that it is not. 
I 
Faced in 1980-1981 with projected state Medicaid 1 costs of 
$42 million more than the state's Medicaid budget of $388 mil-
lion, the directors of the Tennessee Medicaid program de-
cided to institute a variety of cost-saving measures. Among 
these changes was a reduction from 20 to 14 in the number of 
inpatient hospital days per fiscal year that Tennessee Medic-
' Medicaid was established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 
1965, 79 Stat. 343 and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1396 et. seq. (1982). Medic-
aid is a joint state-federal funding program for medical assistance in which 
the federal government approves a State plan for the funding of medical 
services for the needy and then subsidizes a significant portion of the finan-
cial obligations the state has agreed to assume. Once a State voluntarily 
chooses to participate in Medicaid, the State must comply with the require-
ments of Title XIX and applicable regulations. Harris v. McRae , 448 
u. s. 297, 301 (1980). 
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aid would pay hospitals on behalf of a Medicaid recipient. 
Before the new measures took effect, respondents, Tennes-
see Medicaid recipients, brought a class action for declara-
tory and injunctive relief in which they alleged, inter alia, 
that the proposed 14-day limitation on inpatient coverage 
would have a discriminatory effect on the handicapped. The 
basis for this claim was the position that the handicapped 
need and utilize inpatient hosptial services for more than 14 
days a year in significantly greater proportion than the non-
handicapped. Based on this position, respondents asserted 
that the reduction would violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, 29 U. S.C. §794 (1982),and its implementing 
regulations. 2 Section 504 provides tliat: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, 
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance .... 
29 u. s. c. § 794 (1982). 
In a bench trial, respondents introduced statistical evi-
dence that handicapped Medicaid recipients would be 
signficantly more disadvantaged by the 14-day limitation 
than would nonhandicapped recipients. For example, ac-
cording to respondents' figures, 27.4% of the handicapped us-
ers of Tennessee Medicaid required some hospitalization for 
which they would not be reimbursed under the 14-day rule, 
while only 7.8% of the nonhandicapped would be similarly af-
2 The State proposed an array of other changes in its Medicaid program. 
Although respondents challenged many of these other changes, settlement 
was reached on all the proposed changes other than the reduction in the 
number of inpatient days covered. Thus none of the other changes is be-
fore this Court. Respondents also asserted a number of causes of action 
other than their § 504 claim in their original and amended complaints. 
These additional legal theories are similarly not before the Court. 
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fected. 3 Respondents then argued that their showing that 
the 14-day limit would have a disparate impact upon the 
handicapped established a prima facie violation of § 504 and 
its implementing regulations. 4 
In addition, respondents pointed to a variety of ways the 
State might reduce its Medicaid expenditures to the legisla-
s Based on respondents' submissions the district court made the follow-
ing findings: 18.5% of the handicapped who were eligible for assistance 
under the Tennessee Medicaid program actually used Medicaid for one or 
more days of inpatient care, as compared to 13.6% ofnonhandicapped eligi-
bles. For the fiscal year preceding the effective date of the proposed 
changes, 26.5% of the 341,960 individuals eligible for Medicaid in Tennes-
see, and 33% of those who used one or more days of inpatient hospital care, 
were handicapped. At the same time, 63.4% of Medicaid recipients who 
needed more than 14 days of inpatient care were handicapped, and only 
72.6% of the handicapped, as compared to 92.2% of the nonhandicapped, 
would have been fully served by 14 days of coverage. The district court 
questioned the meaningfulness of these findings, see infra, at p. -f=, but 
the findings themselves have not been challenged. 
Since the district court's decision, the state has amended its Medicaid 
program in two minor ways not materially significant to the issues pre-
sented on certiorari. 
'The lower courts, as well as the parties, have treated the class of 
"handicapped" Medicaid recipients as consisting entirely of those individ-
uals who receive Medicaid benefits solely on the basis of blindness or dis-
ability. See J. A. at 40. However, the class of "handicapped" persons 
protected by § 504 is much broader than that group. Section 504 protects 
individuals fully capable of engaging in "substantial gainful activity," 42 
U. S. C. 1382c(3)(A), who have either (i) a physical or mental impairment 
(or a record of such an impairment) which is regarded as limiting their abil-
ity to work, or (ii) a physical or mental impairment (or a record of such an 
impairment) which substantially limits (or is regarded as limiting) some 
other "major life activit[y]." 29 U. S. C. 706(7)(B). Thus, for example, 
dyslexic and hearing-impaired individuals who receive Medicaid would be 
"handicapped" under § 504, but would have been included in the class of 
nonhandicapped Medicaid recipients in the statistics used in the courts 
below. In spite of this incongruity, throughout the litigation the State has 
conceded and the lower courts have found that the proposed reductions will 
have a disparate impact on the handicapped as that group is defined by the 
Rehabilitation Act, see 715 F. 2d, at 1042, n. 7, and we therefore proceed 
on that basis. 
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tively-mandated level, some of which allegedly would have a 
less disproportionate impact on the handicapped than the 14-
day limitation. Respondents acknowledged that virtually 
any limitation on the number of inpatient days covered was 
likely to disadvantage the handicapped disproportionately. 
But respondents also noted that federal law does not require 
states to impose any annual durationallimitation on inpatient 
coverage, that the Medicaid programs of only ten states im-
pose such restrictions, and that as of 1980 the average ceiling 
in those states was 37.6 days. 5 Respondents thus suggested 
that Tennessee follow the lead of other states and do away 
with any limitation on the number of annual inpatient days 
covered. Respondents proposed that the state instead limit 
the number of days of hospital coverage on a per-stay basis, 
with the number of covered days to vary depending on the 
recipient's illness (for example, fixing the number of days 
covered for an appendectomy); the period to be covered for 
each illness could then be set at a level that would keep Ten-
nessee's Medicaid program as a whole within its budget. 6 
According to respondents, this alternative would not have a 
disparate impact upon the handicapped. 7 
The district court held that the State had no federal legal 
obligation to consider these alternatives. At the outset, the 
5 Six states also limit the number of reimbursable days per admission, 
per spell of illness, or per benefit period. See Brief for the United States 
App. B. 
6 See Jennings v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 877, 883 n. 7 (M.D. Tenn. 
1981). Respondents' diagnosis-related reimbursement proposal is sup-
ported by a committee of the Tennessee legislature, which has recom-
mended that the state adopt such a plan. The Medicaid System of the 
Tennessee Department of Public Health, A Report of the Special Joint 
Committee to the Ninety-Third General Assembly, 24, 26 (1983). The 
Court of Appeals seems to have mischaracterized this proposal of respond-
ents as an attemp~ to limit "the total number of visits per annum rather 
than the number of days." 715 F . 2d, at 1044. 
7 Presumably, respondents assumed that the State would not discrimi-
nate against those illnesses most likely to be suffered by the handicapped. 
. . 
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district court expressed some doubt about the accuracy and 
significance of the figures offered by respondents to establish 
their disparate impact claim. 8 Alternatively, the district 
court reasoned that, even if the statistics established that the 
handicapped would be disproportionately affected by the new 
rule, the resulting disparate impact was "not the type of dis-
crimination that§ 504 was intended to proscribe." Jennings 
v. Alexander, 518 F. Supp. 877, 881 (M.D. Tenn. 1981). Ac-
cordingly, the district court rejected respondents' argument 
that the 14-day rule was, prima facie, a violation of§ 504. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed. The majority first found that respondents' 
statistical evidence had established that the proposed reduc-
tion would affect the handicapped significantly more than the 
nonhandicapped. The majority apparently then concluded 
that any action by a federal grantee that disparately affects 
the handicapped states a cause of action under § 504 and its 
implementing regulations. As a result, the Court of Appeals 
held that respondents had established a prima facie violation 
of § 504. The court remanded the case to the district court to 
give Tennessee an opportunity to rebut respondents' prima 
facie case. According to the panel majority, the State could 
either demonstrate the unavailability of alternative plans 
that would achieve the State's legitimate cost-saving goals 
with a less disproportionate impact on the handicapped, or 
the State could offer "a substantial justification for the adop-
tion of the plan with the greater discriminatory impact." 
8 The District Court found that "there was no evidence that the pres-
ence of handicaps was the reason that the handicapped group seemed to 
require an average of more days of hospital care .... " 518 F. Supp., at 
882. On this basis, the District Court stated that any disparate impact of 
the 14-day limit on the handicapped could not be considered discrimination 
"solely by reason of" being handicapped. Id; see 29 U. S. C. § 794. Be-
cause we reverse the Court of Appeals on other grounds, we do not ad-
dress this alternative holding of the District Court. We note, however, 
that this case does not involve services to the handicapped for which the 
differential need is directly traceable to their handicapped condition. 
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Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F. 2d 1036, 1046 (CA6 1983). 
We granted certiorari to consider whether the type of impact 
at issue in this case is cognizable under § 504 or its imple-
menting regulations, and we now reverse. 
II 
The first question the parties urge on the Court is whether 
proof of discriminatory animus is always required to establish 
a violation of § 504 and its implementing regulations, or 
whether federal law also reaches action by a recipient of fed-
eral funding that discriminates against the handicapped by 
effect rather than by design. The State of Tennessee argues 
that § 504 reaches only purposeful discrimination against the 
handicapped. As support for this position, the State relies 
heavily on our recent decision in Guardians Association v. 
Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 103 S. Ct. 
3221 (1983). 
In Guardians, we confronted the question whether Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, et 
seq., (1982), which prohibits discrimination against racial and 
ethnic minorities in programs receiving federal aid, reaches 
both intentional and disparate-impact discrimination. 9 No 
9 Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, 
provides: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance." 
The premise of the State's reliance on Guardians is that § 504 was mod-
elled in part on Title VI, and that the evolution of Title VI regulatory and 
judicial law is therefore relevant to ascertaining the intended scope of 
§ 504. We agree with this basic premise. See S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd 
Cong., 2d Sess., 6390-91, reprinted in 1974 U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
6373 ("Section 504 was patterned after and is almost identical to, the anti-
discrimination language of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. 2000d-1 (relating to race, color, or national origin) and section 901 
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U. S. C. 1683 (relating to sex)"). 
t . 
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opinion commanded a majority in Guardians, and members 
of the Court offered widely varying interpretations of Title 
VI. Nonetheless, a two-pronged holding on the nature of 
the discrimination proscribed by Title VI emerged in that 
case. First, the Court held that Title VI itself directly 
reached only instances of intentional discrimination. 10 Sec-
ond, the Court held that actions having an unjustifiable dis-
parate impact on minorities could be redressed through 
agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of 
Title VI. 11 In essence, then, we held that Title VI had dele-
gated to the agencies in the first instance the complex deter-
mination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities 
constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were 
readily enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices 
of the federal grantees that had produced those impacts. 
Guardians, therefore, does not support petitioner's blan-
ket proposition that federal law proscribes only intentional 
discrimination against the handicapped. Indeed, to the ex-
tent our holding in Guardians is relevant to the interpreta-
tion of § 504, Guardians suggests at a minimum that the 
regulations implementing § 504, upon which respondents in 
part rely, could make actionable the disparate impact chal-
lenged in this case. 12 Moreover, there are reasons to pause 
before too quickly extending even the first prong of Guard-
Nonetheless, as we point out infra, at and n. 13, too facile an assimila-
tion of Title VI law to § 504 must be resisted. 
10 103 S. Ct. at 3236-3237 (opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, in which THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined); id., at 3237 (opinion of 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR); id., at 3249 (opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, in which 
JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN joined). 
11 103 S. Ct. at 3232 (JUSTICE WHITE, announcing the judgment of the 
Court); id., at 3244 n. 15 (opinion of JUSTICE MARSHALL); id., at 3249 
(opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, in which JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACK-
MUN joined). 
12 See also Lau v. Nichols , 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (Stewart, J . , concur-
ring). We conclude infra at~ that in this case the regulations do not in 
fact support respondents' action.\ ,_ b _ ). g-
1 - 13 
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ians to § 504. Cf. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 
S. Ct. 1248 (1984) n. 13 (recognizing distinctions between 
Title VI and § 504)_13 
13 In addition to the nature of the problems with which the § 504 Con-
gress was concerned, see infra +• at least two other considerations 9 -I :2 
counsel hesitation before reading Title VI and § 504 in pari materia with 
respect to the effect/intent issue. First, for seven Justices, the outcome in 
the first prong of Guardians was settled by their view that a majority of 
the Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 
265 (1978) had already concluded that Title VI reached only intentional dis-
crimination. See 103 S. Ct., at 3236 (opinion of JuSTICE POWELL, in 
which 'l'HE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined); id., at 3237 
(opinion of JUSTICE O'CONNOR); id. at 3253, and n. 12 (opinion of STEVENS, 
BRENNAN, and BLACKMUN, JJ., dissenting). Although two of the five 
Justices who were said to have reached such a conclusion in Bakke wrote in 
Guardians to reject this interpretation of Bakke, see 103 S. Ct. at 
3225-3226, and& n. 11 (WHITE, J ., announcing the judgment of the Court); 
id. at 3240-3241 (MARSHALL, ,J., dissenting), in the view of the seven Jus-
tices Bakke controlled as a matter of stare decisis. Had these Justices not 
felt the force of this constraint, it is unclear whether they would have read 
an intent requirement into Title VI. See id., at 3237 (O'CONNOR, J., con-
curring in the judgment) ("Were we construing Title VI without the bene-
fit of any prior interpretation from this Court, one might well conclude that 
the staute was designed to redress more than purposeful discrimination.") 
(citation omitted). For that reason, the conclusion that, in response to fac-
tors peculiar to Title VI, Bakke locked in a certain construction of Title VI 
would not seem to have any obvious or direct applicability to § 504. 
Second, by the time Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act in 1973, 
nearly a decade of experience had been accumulated with the operation of 
the nondiscrimination provisions of Titles VI and VII. By this time, 
model Title VI enforcement regulations incorporating a disparate impact 
standard had been drafted by a presidential task force and the Justice De-
partment, and every Cabinet department and about forty federal agencies 
had adopted standards in which Title VI was interpreted to bar programs 
with a discriminatory impact. See Guardians , 103 S. Ct., at 3240-3241 
(MARSHALL, J ., dissenting). These regulations provoked some contro-
versy in Congress, and in 1966 the House of Representatives rejected a 
proposed amendment that would have limited Title VI to only intentional 
discrimination. /d., at 3241-42. Thus, when Congress in 1973 adopted 
virtually the same language for § 504 that had been used in Title VI, Con-
gress was well aware of the intent/impact issue and of the fact that similar 
. . 
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Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by 
Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious ani-
mus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of be-
nign neglect. 14 Thus, Representative Vanik, introducing the 
predecessor to § 504 in the House, 15 described the treatment 
of the handicapped as one of the country's "shameful over-
sights," which caused the handicapped to live among society 
"shunted aside, hidden, and ignored." 117 Cong. Rec. 45974 
(1971). Similarly, Senator Humphrey, who introduced a 
language in Title VI consistently had been interpreted to reach disparate 
impact discrimination. In refusing expressly to limit § 504 to intentional 
discrimination, Congress could be thought to have approved a disparate 
impact standard for § 504. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 
544, 554 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698-99 
(1979). 
"To be sure, well-catalogued instances of invidious discrimination 
against the handicapped do exist. See, e. g., United States Commission 
on Civil Rights: Accommodating The Spectrum of Individual Abilities, 
Ch. 2 (1983); Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensur-
ing Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 410, 403, n. 2 (1984). 
15 Although § 504 ultimately was passed as part of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, the nondiscrimination principle later codified in § 504 was initially 
proposed as an amendment to Title VI. This proposal was first introduced 
by Representative Yanik in the House. See H. R. 14033, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess., 118 Cong. Rec. 9712 (1972); H. R. 12154, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 
Cong. Rec. 45945 (1971). A companion measure was introduced in the 
Senate by Senators Humphrey and Percy. See S. 3044; 118 Cong. Rec. 
525-526 (1972). The principle underlying these bills was reshaped in the 
next Congress and inserted as § 504 into major vocational rehabilitation 
legislation then pending. Senator Humphrey and Representative Yanik 
indicated that the intent of the original bill had been carried forward into 
§ 504. See 119 Cong. Rec. 6145 (1973) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 118 
Cong. Rec. 32310 (1972) (same); 119 Cong. Rec. 7114 (1973) (statement of 
Rep. Yanik). Given the lack of debate devoted to § 504 in either the 
House or Senate when the Rehabilitation Act was passed in 1973, see R. 
Cappalli, Federal Grants and Cooperative Agencies, § 20:03 (1982), the in-
tent with which Congressman Yanik and Senator Humphrey crafted the 
predecessor to § 504 is a primary signpost on the road toward interpreting 
the legislative history of § 504 . 
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companion measure in the Senate, asserted that "we can no 
longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped in America 
.... " 118 Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972). And Senator Cran-
ston, the acting chairman of the subcommittee that drafted 
§ 504, 16 described the Act as a response to "previous societal 
neglect." 119 Cong. Rec. 5880, 5883 (1973). See also 118 
Cong. Rec. 526 (1972) (statement of co-sponsor Sen. Percy) 
(describing the legislation leading to the 1973 Act as a na-
tional committment to eliminate the "glaring neglect" of the 
handicapped). 17 Federal agencies and commentators on the 
plight of the handicapped similarly have found that dis-
crimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of 
apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus. 18 
In addition, much of the· conduct that Congress sought to 
alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if 
not impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe 
only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent. For exam-
ple, elimination of architechtural barriers was one of the cen-
tral aims of the Act, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 93-318, 93rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1973), for as Senator Randolph pointed 
out, "those things that a person without handicaps take[s] for 
granted-stairs, escalators, narrow doorways-are often in-
surmountable obstacles to thousands of handicapped individ-
uals." 119 Cong. Rec. 5885, 5886 (1973). Yet such barriers 
were clearly not erected with the aim or intent of excluding 
the handicapped. Similarly, Senator Williams, the chairman 
of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee that reported out 
§ 504, asserted that the handicapped were the victims of 
"[d]iscrimination in access to public transportion" and "[d]is-
16118 Cong. Rec. 30680 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph describing 
origins of § 504). 
17 Senator Percy was both a co-sponsor of the predecessor to § 504 and of 
the Senate version of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
18 See, e. g., United States Comm. on Civil Rights, Accommodating the 
Spectrum of Individual Abilities at 17 (1983); Note, Accommodating the 
Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act, 55 N. Y. U. L. R. 881, 883 (1980). 
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crimination because they do not have the simplest forms of 
special services they need .... " 118 Cong. Rec. 3320 
(1972). And Senator Humphrey, again in introducing the 
proposal that later became § 504, listed, among the instances 
of discrimination that the section would prohibit, the use of 
"transportation and architectual barriers," the "discrimina-
tory effect of job qualification ... procedures," and the de-
nial of "special educational assistance" for handicapped chil-
dren. 118 Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972). These statements 
would ring hollow if the resulting legislation could not rectify 
the harms resulting from action that discriminated by effect 
as well as by design. 19 The most obvious evil Congress had 
19 All the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue have agreed 
that, at least under some circumstances, § 504 reaches disparate-impact 
discrimination. See, e. g., New Mexico Ass'nfor Retarded Citizens v. 
New Mexico, 678 F. 2d 847, 854 (CAlO 1982); Pushkin v. Regents of Uni-
versity of Colorado, 658 F. 2d 1372, 1384-1385 (CAlO 1981); Dopico v. 
Goldschmidt, 687 F. 2d 644, 652-653 (CA2 1982); NAACP v. Wilmington 
Medical Center, 657 F . 2d 1322, 1331 (CA3 1981) (en bane); Prewitt v. 
United States Postal Service, 662 F. 2d 292, 305-307 (CA5 1981); Jones v. 
Illinois Dept. of Rehabilitation Services, 689 F. 2d 724 (CA7 1982); Stutts 
v. Freeman, 694 F. 2d 666 (CAll 1983); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citi-
zens v. McDaniel, 716 F. 2d 1565, 1578-1580 (CA111983), vacated for fur-
ther consideration in light of Smith v. Robinson, (104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984)), 
104 S. Ct. 3581 (1984); see also Joyner by Lowry v. Dumpson, 712 F. 2d 
770, 775-76, and n. 7 (CA2 1983) (rejecting use of "adverse impact" theory 
as grounds for challenging state statute that requires parents who desire 
special state-subsidized residential child care services for handicapped chil-
dren to transfer temporary custody of their children to state, but reserving 
question of whether that test might be used in employment discrimination 
actions). 
At least 24 federal agencies have reached the same conclusion. See 5 
CFR 900. 704(b)(3) (OPM); 7 CFR 15b.4(b)(4)(DOA); 10 CFR 4.121(b)(4) 
(NRC); 10 CFR 1040.63(b)(4) (DOE); 14 CFR 1251.103(b)(5) (NASA); 15 
CFR 8b.4(b)(4) (DOC); 18 CFR 1307.4(b)(3) (TVA); 22 CFR 142.4(b)(4) 
(DOS); 22 CFR 217.4(b)(4) (AID/IDCA); 28 CFR 41.51(b)(3), 42.503(b)(3) 
(DOJ); 29 CFR 32.4(b)(4)(DOL); 31 CFR 51.52(b)(1)(vi), 51.55(b)(l) (viii) 
(D. Treas. (ORS)); 32 CFR56.8(a)(6) (DOD); 34 CFR 104.4(b)(4) (D. Ed.); 
38 CFR18.404(b)(4) (VA); 49 Fed. Reg. 1656 (1984) (to be condified at 40 
CFR Pt. 7) (EPA); 41 CFR 101-8.303(d) (GSA); 43 CFR17.203(b)(4) (DOl); 
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in mind when it enacted § 504 would thus seem to have been 
the simple and benign neglect of the handicapped, 20 and we 
therefore hesitate to conclude, with petitioner, that § 504 
reaches only intentional discrimination. 
At the same time, the position urged by respondents-that 
we interpret § 504 to reach all action disparately affecting the 
handicapped-is also troubling. Because the handicapped 
typically are not similarly situated to the nonhandicapped, re-
spondents' position would in essence require each recipient of 
federal funds first to evaluate the effect on the handicapped 
of every proposed action that might touch the interests of the 
handicapped, and then to consider alternatives for achieving 
the same objectives with less severe disadvantage to the 
handicapped. The formalization and policing of this process 
could lead to a wholly unwieldy adminstrative and adjudica-
tive burden. See Note, Employment Discrimination 
Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 
997, 1008 (1984) (describing problems with pure disparate im-
pact model in context of employment discrimination against 
the handicapped). Just as there is reason to question 
whether Congress intended § 504 to reach only intentional 
discrimination, there is similarly reason to question whether 
45 CFR 84.4(b)(4) (HHS); 45 CFR 605.4(b)(4) (NSF); 45 CFR 1151.17(c) 
(NEA); 45 CFR 1170.12(c) (NEH); 45 CFR 1232.4(b)(3) (ACTION); 49 
CFR 27. 7(b)(4) (DOT). We are unaware of any case challenging the facial 
validity of these regulations. 
00 Cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U. S. 324, 335, n. 15 (1976) ("[The] most obvious evil Congress had in 
mind" when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the disparate treat-
ment of minorities."). That disparate treatment was the most obvious evil 
Congress had in mind in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not sug-
gest that it was the only or even the most important evil Congress sought 
to eradicate. See, e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424, 432 
(1971) ("[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in 
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capabil-
ity"); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 454 (1981). 
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Congress intended § 504 to embrace all claims of disparate-
impact discrimination. 
Any interpretation of § 504 must therefore be responsive to 
two powerful but countervailing considerations-the need to 
give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep 
§ 504 within manageable bounds. Given the legitimacy of 
both of these goals and the tension between them, we decline 
the parties' invitation to decide today that one of these goals 
so overshadows the other as to eclipse it. While we reject 
the boundless notion that all disparate-impact showings con-
stitute prima facie cases under § 504, we assume without de-
ciding that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an un-
justifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped. On that 
assumption, we must then determine whether the disparate 
effect of which respondents complain is the sort of disparate 
impact that federal law might recognize. 
III 
To determine which disparate impacts § 504 might make 
actionable, both petitioner and the United States as amicus 
curiae suggest that we focus on the nature of the action being 
challenged. By relying on the nature of the action chal-
lenged and some concept of what constitutes disparate-im-
pact discrimination, petitioner and the Solicitor General 
argue that it is possible to define categories of disparate 
impacts that the statute does, and does not, make actionable. 
The standard offered by petitioner, for example, is that a 
cognizable disparate impact occurs only when a grantee of-
fers a service in a way that has the effect of excluding or oth-
erwise denying the handicapped access to a service. 21 Yet 
such a standard would seem to ignore the importance of as-
suring that the access provided be meaningful rather than 
merely formal. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 
424, 431 (1970). 
21 Br. for Petr. 21. 
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The Solicitor General, responding to the need to assure 
that the Act's guarantees are not merely formal, offers a 
more sophisticated elaboration on petitioner's skeletal stand-
ard. According to the Solicitor General, the touchstone 
under § 504 should be the requirement that the handicapped 
be provided with meaningful access to that benefit which the 
grantee has chosen to provide. Under this standard, the 
grantee has substantial freedom to define the benefit that it 
is choosing to offer, but the grantee must then ensure that 
the handicapped are in fact given meaningful and equal ac-
cess to that benefit. At the same time, the Solicitor General 
recognizes that the grantee cannot be given plenary power 
over the definition of the benefit offered, lest a library with-
out ramps be allowed to be treated as providing meaningful 
access to a rampless library. To avoid this result, the Solici-
tor General adds a refinement to his basic standard by stating 
that the benefit itself cannot be defined in a way that gerry-
manders the handicapped out of the meaningful access to 
which they are entitled. 22 
22 The Solicitor General states that "Antidiscrimination legislation can 
obviously be emptied of meaning if every discriminatory policy is 'col-
lapsed' into one's definition of what is the relevant benefit." Brief for the 
United States As Amicus Curiae at 29, n. 36. At oral argument, the gov-
ernment also acknowledged that "special measures for the handicapped, as 
the Lau case shows, may sometimes be necessary ... . " Tr. of Oral Arg. 
14-15 (referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974)). 
The regulations implementing § 504 are consistent with the view that rea-
sonable adjustments in the nature of the benefit offered must at times be 
made. See, e. g., 45 CFR § 84.12(a) (1983) (requiring an employer to make 
"reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations" 
of a handicapped individual); 45 CFR § 84.22 and § 84.23 (1983) (requiring 
that new buildings be readily accessible, building alterations be accessible 
"to the maximum extent feasible ," and existing facilities eventually be op-
erated so that a program or activity inside is, "when viewed in its en-
tirety," readily accessible); 45 CFR § 84.44(a) (requiring certain modifica-
tions to the regular academic programs of secondary education institutions, 
such as changes in the length of time permitted for the completion of de-
gree requirements, substitution of specific co~ses required for the comple-
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Applying this standard to the facts of this case, the Solici-
tor General notes first that, under Tennessee's new Medicaid 
plan, the handicapped in Tennessee will be provided mean-
ingful and equal access to the benefit of 14 days of covered 
inpatient care. The Solicitor General then suggests that the 
State of Tennessee, by defining the particular Medicaid bene-
fit at issue as 14 days of inpatient coverage, has not gerry-
mandered the handicapped out of meaningful access to inpa-
tient services; the handicapped, like the nonhandicapped, 
may prefer more than 14 days of coverage, but there is noth-
ing in the record to suggest that the handicapped cannot 
make full and meaningful use of the 14 days of inpatient serv-
ices for which they will be covered. Thus, according to the 
Solicitor General's approach, respondents have failed to es-
tablish a prima facie violation of § 504. 
There is much to commend in this approach. First, the 
threshold requirement that the handicapped be provided 
with meaningful access to the offerred benefit is consistent 
with our approach to disparate-impact discrimination in other 
contexts. For example, under Title VIIi.: the use of stand-
ards, tests or judgments that tend to exclude protected 
groups disproportionate! constltu e Impermissible dispar-
ate-impact iscrimmatwn except when the use is justified by 
business necessity. See, e. g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U. S. 405 (1975). Similarly, the Solicitor Gener-
al's theory recognizes that, even when the handicapped are 
allowed entrance into a program or access to a benefit, a dis-
criminatory denial of meaningful access can result when rea-
sonable adjustments to the program or benefit are not made 
to accommodate the handicapped. Cf. Irving Independent 
School District v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371, 3377 (1984). 
The Solicitor General's theory is also generally consistent 
with Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 
397 (1979), our major previous attempt to define the scope of 
tion of degree requirments, and adaptation of the manner in which specific 
courses are conducted). 
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§ 504. 23 Davis involved a plaintiff with a major hearing dis-
ability who sought admission to a college to be trained as a 
registered nurses, but who would not be capable of safely 
performing as a registered nurse even with fulltime personal 
superviSion. We stated that, under some circumstances, a 
"refusal to modify an existing program might become unrea-
sonable and discriminatory. Identification of those instances 
where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled per-
son amounts to discrimination against the handicapped [is] an 
important responsibility of HEW." 442 U. S., at 412-413. 
We held that the college was not required to admit Davis be-
cause it app~ared unlikely that she could benefit from any 
modifications that the relevant HEW regulations required, 
id., at 409, and because the further modifications Davis 
sought-full-time, personal supervision whenever she at-
tended patients and elimination of all clinical courses-would 
have compromised the essential nature of the college's nurs-
ing program, id., at 413-414. Such a "fundamental alter-
ation in the nature of a program" was far more than the rea-
sonable modifications the statute or regulations required. 
Id., at 410. 
Davis thus struck a balance between the statutory rights 
of the handicapped to be integrated into society and the le-
gitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving the integ-
rity of their programs: while a grantee need not be required 
to make "fundamental" or "substantial" modifications to ac-
commodate the handicapped, it may be required to make 
"reasonable" ones. Compare 442 U. S., at 410 with id., at 
23 Davis addressed that portion of § 504 which requires that a handi-
capped individual be "otherwise qualified" before the nondiscrimination 
principle of§ 504 becomes relevant. However, the question of who is "oth-
erwise qualified" and what actions constitute "discrimination" under the 
Section would seem to be two sides of a single coin; the ultimate question is 
the extent to which a grantee is required to make reasonable modifications 
in its programs for the needs of the handicapped. 
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412-413. 24 This balance appears consonant with that struck 
by the Solicitor General's requirements that grantees provide 
meaningful access to their benefits and services and that the 
benefit or service not be defined in a way that gerrymanders 
the handicapped out of meaningful access. 
To the extent we have difficulties with the Solicitor Gener-
al's basic approach, they result principally from the vague-
ness with which the notion of gerrymandering is defined. At 
points in its brief, the government appears to suggest that 
the non-gerrymandering requirement precludes only the 
most egregious refusals to modify the nature of the benefit 
being offered-for example, an attempt to deprive hearing 
impaired individuals of the right to become busdrivers with 
the claim that the benefit offered is that of a job-without-
hearing-aid. Cf. Strathie v. Department of Transportation, 
716 F. 2d 227 (CA3 1983). Such a narrow concept of gerry-
mandering would seem to border on a requirement that proof 
of intentional discrimination be shown. Cf. Gomillion v. 
24 In Davis, we stated that § 504 does not impose an "affinnative-action 
obligation on all recipients of federal funds." 442 U. S., at 411. Our use 
of the term affinnative action in this context has been severely criticized 
for failing to appreciate the difference between affinnative action and rea-
sonable accommodation; the former is said to refer to a remedial policy for 
the victims of past discrimination, while the latter relates to the elimina-
tion of existing obstacles against the handicapped. See Note, Accommo-
dating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N. Y.U. L. R. 881, 885-86 (1980); Note, Ac-
commodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 After South-
eastern, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 171, 185-86 (1980); see also Dopico v. 
Goldschmidt, 687 F. 2d 644, 652 (CA2 1982) ("Use of the phrase 'affinna-
tive action' in this context is unfortunate, making it difficult to talk about 
any kind of affinnative efforts without importing the special legal and so-
cial connotations of that term."). Regardless of the aptness of our choice 
of words in Davis, it is clear from the context of Davis that the term affinn-
ative action referred to those "changes," "adjustments," or "modifications" 
to existing programs that >yould be "substantial," 442 U. S., at 410, 411, 
n. 10, 413, or that would constitute "fundamental alteration[s] in the na-
ture of a program .... " I d., at 410. 
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Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). Yet at other points in its 
brief, the government takes the position that reasonable ac-
commodations in the nature of the benefit being offered may 
at times be necessary to assure compliance with the Act. 25 
This apparent ambiguity in the concept of gerrymandering 
set forth by the Solicitor General need not be confronted in 
this case. For even if we assume that the Act requires both 
meaningful access and reasonable modifications in the nature 
of the benefit offered, it does not follow that every claim of 
disparate-impact discrimination states a prima facie violation 
of § 504. First, judicial experienc~ ~th other areas of dis-
crimination law sufficiently channe!;fhe inquiry into mean-
ingful access to allow coherent limitations on this require-
ment to be set. Second, by reference to the Act itself, its 
implementing regulations, and the nature of the changes 
sought, it is possible to define outer boundaries on the 
reasonableness of proposed modifications to the benefit being 
offerred. As analysis of this case reveals, respondents' dis-
parate-impact claim is sufficiently removed from established 
patterns of discriminatory practices, and would require modi-
fications far enough outside the boundaries of reasonable-
ness, that the claim must fail. We therefore adopt for pur-
poses of this decision the more expansive reading of the 
Solicitor General's approach and analyze respondents' claim 
on that basis. 
IV 
Respondents appear to proceed on either of two theories. 
First, they seem to argue that 14 days of inpatient coverage 
is not as effective for the handicapped as the nonhandicapped 
because more of the handicapped than the nonhandicapped 
will need coverage beyond 14 days. Second, respondents 
suggest that any annual durational limitation on inpatient 
coverage discriminates against the handicapped because (1) 
the effect of the limitation will fall most heavily on them and 
215 See supra, n. 22. 
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(2) this harm could be avoided by the choice of other cost-sav-
ings plans that would not disproportionately disadvantage 
the handicapped. Under either theory, respondents have 
failed to establish a prima facie violation of federal law. 
A 
We begin by examining the nature of the practice chal-
lenged to determine whether it denies the handicapped mean-
ingful access to the benefit being offered. This inquiry is 
guided by our experience in other contexts with practices 
that are neutral on their face but that have an unjustifiable 
discriminatory effect on a protected class. As noted above, 
the use of criteria, judgments, or standards that tend to dis-
proportionately exclude members of such a group without 
justification impermissibly denies meaningful access. See, 
e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra; Albemarle Paper 
Co. v. Moody, supra. Meaningful access can also be denied 
when a handicapped individual satisfies all threshold eli ·bil-
ity criteria but is · denied the opportunity to share in the 
benefits of a grantee's program. Cf. Irving Independent 
School Distsrict v. Tatro, supra. See generally J. Wegner, 
The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensuring Equal 
Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 401, 
459-498 (1984) (discussing exclusionary criteria and denials of 
access in context of discrimination against handicapped). 
The State's reduction in inpatient hospital coverage cannot 
be assailed on either of these bases. In reducing state Med-
icaid coverage, Tennessee has not invoked criteria that have 
a particular exclusionary effect on the handicapped; the re-
duction does not distinguish between those whose coverage 
will be reduced and those whose coverage will not on the 
basis of any test, judgment, or trait that the handicapped as a 
class are less capable of meeting or less likely of having. 
Moreover, it cannot be argued that "meaningful access" to 
State Medicaid services will be denied by the 14-day limita-
83-727-0PINION 
20 ALEXANDER~ CHOATE 
tion on inpatient coverage; nothing in the record suggests 
that the handicapped in Tennessee will be unable to benefit 
meaningfully from the coverage they will receive under the 
14-day rule. 2a The reduction in inpatient coverage will leave 
both handicapped and nonhandicapped Medicaid users with 
identical and effective hospital services fully available for 
their use, with both classes of users subject to the same 
durationallimitation. 
That the practice challenged in this case neither relies on 
exclusionary factors nor denies meaningful access to state 
Medicaid significantly weakens respondents' claim. Re-
spondents do not challenge a form of disparate-impact dis-
crimination that we have refused to condone in other con-
texts. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972). 
B 
Because respondents challenge a practice that does not 
deny them meaningful access to or exclude them from the 
benefit being offered, we turn to the question whether Ten-
nessee has failed to make reasonable modifications in its Med-
icaid services to accommodate the needs of the handicapped. 
To define the outer boundaries of this requirement, we be-
lieve it is useful to look first to the substantive area in which 
the disparate impact occurs. In enacting the Rehabilitation 
Act and in subsequent amendments,'n Congress focused on 
211 The record does not contain any suggestion that the illnesses uniquely 
associated with the handicapped or occurring with greater frequency 
among them cannot be effectively treated, at least in part, with fewer than 
14 days coverage. In addition, the durationallimitation does not apply to 
only particular handicapped conditions and takes effect regardless of the 
particular cause of hospitalization. 
27 The year after the Rehabilitation Act was passed, Congress returned 
to it with important amendments that clarified the scope of § 504. See 
Pub. L. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). While these amendments and their 
history cannot substitute for a clear expression of legislative intent at the 
time of enactment, Davis, 442 U. S., at 411, n. 11, as virtually contempora-
neous and more specific elaborations of the general norm that Congress 
had enacted into law the previous year, the amendments and their history 
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several substantive areas in which it viewed the societal costs 
of discrimination against the handicapped to be particularly 
high. 28 
One area to which § 504 is clearly and centrally directed is 
that of employment. Indeed, we have held previously that 
"the primary goal of the Act is to increase employment." 
Consolidated Rail Corp v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248, 1254, n. 
13 (1984). 29 Given the vast amounts of money Congress in-
vested in rehabilitation training in the 1973 Act and subse-
quent amendments, Congress was naturally concerned that 
the rehabilitated be able to find jobs. 30 See generally 29 
do shed significant light on the intent with which § 504 was enacted. See, 
e. g., Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U. S. 657, 666-671 (1979); Seatrain 
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 572, 596 (1979). Congress 
again amended Title V of the Rehabilitation Act in 1978, in the process in-
corporating the enforcement mechanisms available under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Pub. L. 95-602, § 505(a)(2), 29 U. S. C. 
§ 794a 91982). We have previously relied on the post-1973 legislative ac-
tions to interpret § 504. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 
1248, 1253-1254 (1984). 
28 In addition to the moral entitlement of the handicapped to be inte-
grated into society, see, e. g., 119 Cong. Rec. 5882-83 (1973) (statement of 
Sen. Cranston), Congress was concerned with the social costs of various 
disadvantages suffered by the handicapped. Congress recognized that ac-
commodations costly in the short term were often in the long term cost-
effective. For example, rehabilitated persons were found to increase their 
personal income greatly-in fiscal year 1976, the increase was estimated to 
be over one billion dollars-and to pay at least 6% of this income in taxes to 
federal, state, and local governments. H. R. Rep. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess., at 9 (1978); see also S. Rep. No. 1135, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 12 
(1972) (reaching same conclusion). In fact, "[c]onservative estimates of 
the ratio of benefits to costs [of rehabilitation] have ranged between 8 to 1 
and 35 to 1." H. R. Rep. No. 1149, supra, at 9. 
'l!iJWe further said in that case, "[i]ndeed, enhancing employment of the 
handicapped was so much the focus of the 1973 legislation that Congress 
the next year felt it necessary to amend the statute to clarify whether § 504 
was intended to prohibit other types of discrimination as well. See 
§ 111(a), Pub. L. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617, 1619 (1974), amending 29 U. S. C. 
§ 706(6); S. Rep. No. 93-1297, p. 37 (1974)." 104 S. Ct., at 1253-1254. 
30 See, e. g., 119 Cong. Rec. 5882 (1973) (Sen. Cranston); id., at 24587 
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U. S. C. § 701 (11) (1976 ed.). 
Education was also at the core of the areas to which the 
Act was directed. See, e. g., 117 Cong. Rec. 45,974 (1971) 
(statement of Rep. Yanik); 118 Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972) 
(statement of Sen. Humphrey). Senator Cranston said, 
"For those individuals who have handicapped children, the 
expenditure of dollars for programs which meet their needs 
and the needs of their children is a simple return on the eq-
uity from their taxes which has long since been warranted." 
119 Cong. Rec. 5882-5883 (1973). See also 118 Cong. Rec. 
3320-3322 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams). The extent 
to which the handicapped must be accommodated in public 
education is now, of course, controlled in significant part by 
the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. §§ 1400 et 
seq., 31 but where it is not, these statements indicate an ex-
plicit congressional concern with refusals to accommodate the 
handicapped in the provision of educational services. 
Finally, the gradual elimination of existing physical barri-
ers to access and to transportation, and the construction of 
barrier-free new facilities, were also among the central con-
gressional objectives informing § 504. See 29 U. S. C. 
§ 701(11) (1976 ed.) (authorizing agencies to "develop solu-
tions to existing architectural and transportation barriers im-
peding handicapped individuals"); see also S. Rep. No. 
93-318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1973). Indeed, the Senate 
Report to 1974 Amendments to the Act listed architectural 
barriers as among the forms of discrimination forbidden by 
§ 504. S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1974). 
We do not, of course, intimate any view on specific questions 
regarding the sorts of alterations in barriers to access that 
might be required to accommodate the handicapped, com-
(Sen. Taft); S. Rep. No. 93-318, p. 4 (1973). 
31 See, e. g., Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457, 3474 (1984); Irving In-
dependent School District v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984); Board of Edu-
cation of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 
176 (1982). 
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pare, e. g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F. 2d 644 (CA2 1982) 
with American Public Transit Association v. Lewis, 655 F. 
2d 1271 (CA DC 1981), but it is clear that Congress was very 
much concerned with the problems posed by physical barriers 
to access. 32 
Neither of the theories upon which respondents rely places 
the action challenged within one of these substantive spheres 
with which Congress manifested particular concern. We 
have no doubt that the Act aims at assuring that the handi-
capped be able to make effective use of those health services 
that a recipient of federal funds provides. See 45 CFR 
§ 84.52 (1983). But to accept what seems to be respondents' 
first claim-that the handicapped, unlike the nonhandi-
capped, must be provided with more than 14 days of inpatient 
coverage simply because the handicapped would dispropor-
tionately benefit from this extended coverage-we would 
have to find that the Rehabilitation Act views certain ill-
nesses, ie., those particularly affecting the handicapped, as 
more important than others and more worthy of cure through 
government subsidization. We find nothing to support the 
ascription of such an intent to Congress. Cf. Doe v. 
Coulotti, 592 F. 2d 704 (CA3 1979) (state may limit covered 
private inpatient pyschiatric care to 60 days even though 
state sets no limit on duration of coverage for physical ill-
nesses). And to uphold respondents' second, and apparently 
primary, theory-that State Medicaid programs must be de-
signed to meet their funding limitations in the way that maxi-
mizes the provision of medical services to the handicapped-
we would have to conclude that Congress desired to make 
major inroads on the States' long-standing discretion to 
choose the proper mix of amount, scope, and duration limita-
tions on services covered by State Medicaid, see Beal v. Doe, 
32 Rehabilitation training, of course, was also central to the purposes of 
the 1973 Act, and such training might involve issues concerning specific 
health care benefits. In this case, however, respondents have never as-
serted that the 14-day rule has any effect at all on rehabilitation programs. 
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432 U. S. 438, 444 (1977). Absent any indication that Con-
gress even considered this basic alteration in the long-stand-
ing structure of another Federal program, we decline to read 
the Rehabilitation Act itself as having such an effect. As a 
result, neither of respondents' theories brings their case 
within a substantive realm with regard to which Congress 
expressly focused concern on the possible need for accommo-
dations to the handicapped. This factor weakens the claim 
that the failure to adjust the benefit being offered to some-
thing other than 14 days of inpatient coverage is unreason-
able enough to state a prima facie case of disparate-impact 
discrimination. 
c 
The extent to which agency regulations or other adminis-
trative actions suggest that a particular adjustment in the 
benefit being offered is a reasonable accommodation may also 
be an important factor in determining whether a prima facie 
case of discrimination can be established. See Guardians 
Association v. Civil Service Commission of New York, 103 
S. Ct. 3221 (1983); see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984) (holding that 1978 Amend-
ments to the Act were intended to codify the regulations en-
forcing § 504); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 
442 U. S., at 413 ("Identification of those instances where a 
refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person 
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped person 
continues to be an important responsibility of HEW"). 33 
33 The original Act delegated broad authority to HEW to "conduct vari-
ous studies and experiments to focus on long neglected problem areas." 
29 U. S. C. § 701 (7) (1976 ed.). In addition, 1974 Amendments clarified 
the scope of § 504 by making clear that those charged with administering 
the Act had substantial leeway to explore areas in which discrimination 
against the handicapped posed particularly significant problems and to de-
vise regulations to prohibit such discrimination. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 
93-1297 at 40-41, 56 (1974); see also supra, n. 27. HEW's functions in this 
area have now been assumed by its successor, the Department of Health 
and Human Services, and by the Department of Justice. 
.. 
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Respondents indeed place substantial reliance on the regu-
lations implementing§ 504, particularly 45 CFR § 84.52(a)(3). 
That regulation states that recipients of federal funds who 
provide health services cannot "provide a qualified handi-
capped person with benefits or services that are not as effec-
tive (as defined in § 84.4(b)) as the benefits or services pro-
vided to others." Drawing on this provision, respondents 
assert that their Medicaid coverage is less effective than that 
provided to the nonhandicapped, apparently because the 
handicapped have a greater need for more than 14 days of 
coverage than the nonhandicapped. Respondents also point 
to 45 CFR § ~4.4(b)(4), which prohibits utilization of 
criteria or methods of administration (i) that have the ef-
fect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to dis-
crimination on the basis of handicap, (ii) that have the 
purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's pro-
gram with respect to the handicapped, (iii) that perpetu-
ate the discrimination of another recipient if both recipi-
ents are subject to common administrative control or are 
agencies of the same State. 
From this provision respondents seem to conclude that the 
failure to adopt a cost-savings plan less disproportionately 
disadvantageous to them has the effect of substantially im-
pairing Tennessee's presumed objective of providing ade-
quate health care to the handicapped. 34 
"'Respondents also rely on a variety of other regulations. See, e. g., 45 
CFR § 84.52(a)(2) (stating that a recipient who provides health services 
cannot "[a]fford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to receive 
benefits or services that is not equal to that offered nonhandicapped per-
sons"); 45 CFR § 84.4 (b)(l)(iii) (prohibiting a recipient of federal funds 
from providing "a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit, or 
service that is not as effective as that provided to others"); 45 CFR 
§ 84.4(b)(l)(ii) (stating that a recipient cannot "[a]fford a qualified handi-
capped person an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, ben-
efit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others") . 
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When viewed as a whole, however, the regulations do not 
sufficiently support either of the conclusions respondents 
would have us reach. First, 45 CFR § 84.4(b), referred to in 
the regulations upon which respondents rely, makes clear 
that: 
"For purposes of this part, aids, benefits, and services, 
to be equally effective, are not required to produce the 
identical result or level of achievement for handicapped 
and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handi-
capped persons equal opportunity to obtain the same re-
sult, to gain the same benefit or to reach the same level 
of achievement . . . . " 
45 CFR 84.4(b)(2). 
Although this regulation indicates that adjustments to exist-
ing programs are contemplated,35 it does not support the no-
tion that the handicapped must get sufficient inpatient cover-
age beyond 14 days to assure that their illnessess are as 
effectively treated as the illnesses of the nonhandicapped. 
The regulation cannot plausibly be read to suggest that Ten-
nessee is obligated to define the offered benefit, not as a 
package of concrete health services, but rather as the amor-
phous objective of "adequate health care." 35 Read in con-
36 The interpretive analysis accompanying these regulations states that 
the term 'equally effective,' defined in paragraph (b)(2), is intended to en-
compass the concept of equivalent, as opposed to identical, services and to 
acknowledge the fact that in order to meet the individual needs of handi-
capped persons to the same extent that the corresponding needs of non-
handicapped persons are met, adjustments to regular programs or the pro-
vision of different programs may sometimes be necessary." 
45 CFR Pt. 84 App. A. 116 (1983). 
36 The interpretive analysis to the regulations supports the conclusion 
that the regulations do not require this change: 
One common misconception about the regulation [ 45 CFR 84.52(a) (1983)] 
is that it would require specialized hospitals and other health care provid-
ers to treat all handicapped persons. The regulation makes no such re-
quirement. Thus, a burn treatment center need not provide other types 
of medical treatment to handicapped persons unless it provides such medi-
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junction with each other, the regulations therefore do not 
support a conclusion that the handicapped are entitled to any 
different durationallimitation on inpatient coverage than the 
nonhandicapped. 37 
Respondents' alternative theory suffers from a similar de-
fect. We decline to transform the general terms in which 
the regulations are drafted into the specific requirement that 
state Medicaid programs must always choose, from among 
various otherwise legitimate benefit and service options, the 
particular option most favorable to the handicapped. Al-
though some coverage for inpatient hospital care must be 
provided under the federal Medicaid program, 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 1396a(a)(13) and 1396(a), the states generally retain broad 
discretion to set reasonable limits on the package of amount, 
scope, and duration limitations that make up the state Medic-
aid program. See generally Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 444 
(1977). 38 In effect, then, respondents ask us to hold that the 
cal services to nonhandicapped persons. It could not, however, refuse to 
treat the burns of a deaf person because of his or her deafness. 
45 CFR Pt. 84 App. A ~ 33 (1983); see also 45 CFR Pt. 84 App. A. ~ 37 
(1983). 
While these analyses might be read to suggest only that health care pro-
viders need not take steps that would compromise the essential nature of 
their programs, we read them as establishing the more general proposition 
that, while reasonable accommodations must sometimes be made, substan-
tial subsidization of the particular medical needs of the handicapped is not 
required. 
37 Respondents do not seek to have the 20-day limitation reinstated; as 
respondents admitted at oral argument, the 20-day rule is also disadvanta-
geous to the handicapped in the sense that the handicapped, in greater per-
centage than the nonhandicapped, also need more than 20 days of inpatient 
coverage a year. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. Indeed, the evidence at trial sug-
gested that the 20-day rule had a greater disproporionate impact on the 
handicapped than the 14-day rule would have. See Brief for United States 
App. C, at lla. 
88 Under the federal Medicaid regulations, a state plan must: 
provide such safeguards as may be necessary to asssure that eligibility for 
care and services under the plan will be determined, and such care and 
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§ 504 regulations were designed to impose major constraints, 
over and above those imposed by federal Medicaid require-
ments, on a state's choice of how to allocate funding among 
the different components of the state Medicaid program. 
Whatever the scope of HHS's authority to promulgate 
regulations furthering the purposes of § 504, the language of 
the regulations upon which respondents rely is far too broad 
to permit the conclusion respondents seek. Before we would 
find that these generally-worded regulations were intended 
to limit a state's long-standing discretion to set reasonable 
Medicaid coverage rules, that intent would have to be indi-
cated with greater specificity in the regulations themselves, 
or in interpretive analyses or agency policy statements. The 
agency, however, has taken no authoritative position on the 
question. 39 In the absence of such a position or some specific 
indication that HHS believes that states must abandon rea-
sonable durational limitations on inpatient days covered, we 
decline to conclude that, in promulgating the § 504 regula-
tions, the agency intended implicitly to make major alter-
ations in state Medicaid choices that HEW itself had long ap-
proved. We therefore conclude that the § 504 regulations do 
not require Tennessee to abandon its annual limitation on the 
number of inpatient days covered under state Medicaid. 
D 
Finally, and for many of the reasons just canvassed, it is 
clear that respondents' claims would require a remedy suffi-
services will be provided in a manner consistent with ... the best interests 
of the recipients. 
42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(1982). Both lower courts found that 95% of all Med-
icaid recipients would have their hospitalization needs met under the 14-
day rule, and thus that the "best interests" standards had been met. 
39 The Solictor General asserts that the regulations are not intended to 
have such an effect. 
Although respondents filed an administrative complaint with the HHS 
Office of Civil Rights and sought a decision on whether the 14-day limita-
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ciently burdensome to the grantee as to constitute the "sub-
stantial" and fundamental" modifications that Davis held can-
not be required of a federal grantee. 442 U. S., at 413. 
Tennessee has made a policy choice to limit the rate of 
growth of state Medicaid expenditures, and the adminis-
trators of the state Medicaid program have responded with a 
judgment as to how to distribute the burdens resulting from 
that legislative choice. To require that such broad-based 
distributive decisions always be made in the way least dis-
advantageous to the handicapped would be to impose a virtu-
ally unworkable situation on state Medicaid administrators. 
The administrative costs of that solution are beyond the rea-
sonable accommodations Davis suggests might, under the 
proper circumstances, be required. 
v 
Respondents' allegations of disparate-impact discrimina-
tion are sufficiently novel, sufficiently unaccounted for in the 
statute and regulations, and would require a sufficiently bur-
densome remedy that respondents could not possibly estab-
lish that they have been denied meaningful access to Medic-
aid services in Tennessee or that Tennessee has refused to 
make reasonable accommodations in the nature of the Medic-
aid services it provides. We intimate no view on whether 
any one of these failings is necessary or sufficient to defeat a 
disparate-impact claim, but their conjunction in this case 
makes clear that respondents have not been unlawfully dis-
criminated against. Assuming, then, that § 504 or its imple-
menting regulations reach some claims of disparate-impact 
discrimination against the handicapped, the disparate impact 
of Tennessee's reduction in annual inpatient Medicaid cover-
age is not among them. For that reason, the Court of Ap-
peals erred in holding that respondents had established a 
tion violated § 504 and its implementing regulations, that complaint still 
has not been acted upon. J. A. 38-39. 
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prima facie violation of§ 504. The judgment below is accord-
ingly reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
alb 11/16/84 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: No. 83-727, Alexander v. Choate, Justice Marshall's first 
draft 
There is obviously too much loose language in the 
opinion. Although I think that most of the dicta is harmless, 
there are a couple of points worth mentioning: 
(1) Justice Marshall states that he is assuming that §504 reaches 
some conduct which has only a disparate impact. Nevertheless, 
~ the opinion strongly implies that §504 is not limited to 
~Jintentional discrimination. I do not find this troubling because 
I think that §504 was intended to prohibit some unintentional 
discrimination. Congress was concerned about "benign neglect," 
as well as with intentional discrimination. But if you feel that 
§504 should be interpreted like Title VI, so as to prohibit only 
~-----------~--------------------intentional discrimination, you probably will find Justice 
Marshall's extended discussion on this issue troubling. 
(2) After deciding that the respondents had not been denied 
meaningful access, Justice Marshall goes on to consider whether a 
"reasonable accomodation" should have bee~ made for the 
handicapped. I do not think that this second question should 
have been reached. If a handicapped person has meaningful access 
to a federally-funded program, §504 does not require that any 
"reasonable accomodation" be made. It is in cases like 
Southeastern Community College, where the handicapped person is 
denied access to the program, that the "rea~onable ac~omodation" 
question is reached. 
\ 
'1 
I think that Justice O'Connor is preparing a short 
concurring opinion that will be circulated shortly. I recommend 
that you wait until that opinion is circulated before you join 
the Marshall opinion. 
CHAMBERS Of' 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Thurgood, 
.tJqtrtw Qlourt #f t4t ~ttittb .ttatt.S' 
Jlulfhtgt#n. ~. Ql. 2.0~-'t~ 
No. 83-727 Alexander v. Choate 
I have read your thorough draft op1n1on in this case and, 
although its scholarship is impressive, I am concerned that 
because of its length and complexity it may not furnish the 
helpful guidance~ agenc1es affected by §504 need for their 
day to day operations. At present, I am disposed to circulate a 
bri~r~~nce in the judgment that would attempt to 
characterrze-what I believe to be the Court's essential holding. 
Based on the discussion at Conference, I understood a 
majority of the Court to believe that, without addressing whether 
discriminatory intent is necessary to establish a violat1on of 
S20j, tfie ~ype of afSparace ~ effect involved here does no~ 
constitute a pr1ma fa~ie case of crnlawful disciiminat1on. 
Tennessee, consistent with state and f"ederal law conc'erning 
Medicaid, has chosen to provide 14 days of coverage for inpatient 
hospital care. That decision is not alleged to reflect 
discriminatory int~n~, antt""""ffie"S'ntefias not defined the benefit 
in a way to exclude or deny access solely on the basis of a 
person's handicapped condition. Instead, the State has provided 
the same benefit -- 14 days of coverage -- to 60th handicapped 
andl1onnandicapped persons. Section 504 does not require a state 
to define benefits so as to guarantee equal results or 
effectiveness for handicapped recipients. The fact that the 
(
handicapped need or desire more of the benefit than the State has 
chosen to provide does not in itself constitute discrimination in 
violation of the statute. 
My concurrence will briefly elaborate on these views as 
the grounds for reversing the Court of Appeals. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
Jlupunu Q14turl 4tf tlr~ ~nittb .-tat~• 
.. aar.Jrlqton. ~. Q1. 2Dp,.~ 
November 19, 1984 
Re: 83-727 - Alexander v. Choate 
Dear Thurgood: 





Copies to the Conference 
.. 
November 19 , 1984 
83-727 Alexander v. Choate 
Dear 'rhurgood: 
I h.::tve concerns about your opi.nion. simi.l~r to 
those expressed by Sandra in her letter of ~ovember 16. 
There is a substantial amount of dicta that is 
unnecessary to a decision of this case, and that may cause 
trouble for us in subsequent cases . As t reao the opinion, 
it strongly impl ie:-3 that. ~ 504 is not limited to intentional 
oiscrimination. It can be arqued that ~504 should be inter-
preted like Title VI as applicable onlv to intentional dls-
crimination. I am not certain how I woul~ eventually decide 
this question, but do not Wftnt to commit unnecessarilY in 
this case. 
I also am troubled bv considerinq whether a "re~­
sonable accommodation" should have been made for the han~i­
capoed. My understanding is that if a handicapped person 
has non-discriminatory access to a federally funded program, 
§504 does not require that some ad~itional "reasonable ac-
commodation" be made . In Southeastern Community College, 
where the handicapoed person was denierl accPss to thP pro-
gram, ¥Te reached the "reasonable accommodation" question . 
Perhaps a second draft of your opinion will meet 
thes~ concerns . For the present , I will await further 




cc: The Conference 
C HAM BER S OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.jnpunu Qinttrlltf tlft ~tb .ibdts 




November 20, 1984 
Re: No. 83-727 Alexander v. Choate 
Dear Thurgood: 
I, too, have concerns about your draft opinion, 
although they differ from those already expressed by Lewis 
and Sandra. 
I agree with most of your discussion of what is 
required to make out a prima facie case under §504, 
including your treatment of whether §504 reaches more than 
intentional discrimination. Like Lewis, however, I read the 
draft to imply that, even where meaningful access to the 
government benefit is provided, §504 may nevertheless 
require "reasonable accommodation" of benefits for the 
handicapped above and beyond meaningful access. The first 
sentence of Part IVB contains such an implication, and that 
implication seems to carry through Parts !VB & IVC. I don't 
think this question needs to be addressed, and whether or 
not there may be situations where such accommodations are 
required the question is best left for the future. I 
believe that you can address respondent's argument that the 
State must adopt plans with the least adverse effect on the 
handicapped without implying that §504 may sometimes require 
such accommodations. 
Finally, I agree with Sandra's understanding of the 
Conference discussion. For me, the State's decision here to 
provide a benefit of 14 days of hospital coverage simply 
does not result in a "discriminatory impact" as I understand 
that concept. Only if the benefit provided were viewed as 
"adequate health care" would it be possible to find such a 
"discriminatory impact." But the State has not undertaken 
through Medicaid to provide all its citizens with adequate 
health care. In this case the State has defined the benefit 






reasonable and not designed to discriminate solely on the 
basis of handicap. The draft opinion indicates th~t my 
position is perhaps correct~ however, I would be h~ppier if 
it were endorsed more clearly. Certain statements ' on page 
29 imply that the State's decision resulted in a disparate 
impact in this case. 
If you could accommodate my views in a second draft, I 
would hope to be able to join. 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
· r~ ~ 
I 
CHAMI!II!:R8 01'" 
..JUSTICE w ... ..J . 5RENNAN, ..JR. 
November 23, 1984 
.. 
No. 83-727 
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.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.Snprtntt Qfllttrl llf tlrt ~b ,jtatts 
'JIJasJringhtn. ~. Of. 21lp~~ , 
November 26, 1984 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 83-727-Alexander v. Choate 
As soon as possible,.! will circulate a completely 






.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
"•tmt 01~= #f flrt ~b •tatt• 
Jfu~ ~. ~· 20c?>l' 
December 3, 1984 
No. 83-727 
Alexander v. Choate 
Dear Thurgood, 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
jlnprtttU <lfattri cf tlyt 'Jttnittb ~taits 
._aslp:ttgtcn:. ~. <If. 20,?~~ 
December 10, 1984 
Re: No. 83-727 Alexander v. Choate 
Dear Thurgood, 
Your revised draft in this case answers many of the 
concerns I expressed in my previous memo, but I still have 
one general and a few specific problems that I hope you 
might be able to address. 
The general problem involves your treatment of the 
Davis case and the idea that "reasonable accommodation" of 
benefits may be required by the Act. First, I note that 
although on page 13 you assume arguendo that Davis may 
require such accommodations, on page 20, the full paragraph, 
your language is considerably more direct, and indicates 
that Davis "requires" certain reasonable accommodations. I 
do not th1nk that Davis "requires" any accommodations beyond 
meaningful access, although it does indicate that some 
· tinkering with a benefit may be necessary to fulfill the 
Act's directive to provide meaningful access to an otherwise 
qualified handicapped person. Since on page 19 you conclude 
that the regulation at issue affords meaningful access, I 
find the paragraph on page 20, and some subsequent 
statements, very confusing, because they suggest that Davis 
requires reasonable accommodation of benefits when 
meaningful access is concededly afforded. As I said in my 
previous memo, I believe this question can await another 
day. 
I am troubled by this paragraph for another reason. 
The final sentence states that the "reasonable 
accommodation" inquiry involves essentially a cost-benefit 
analysis each time a particular accommodation is urged on 
the courts. Sandra expresses problems, and I concur, with 
having courts undertake such an analysis each time a 
handicapped person argues that certain adjustments would 
cost less than the benefit they would confer. 
- 2 -
I do not believe we need to decide these questions in 
this case; it would be sufficient to state that h~re 
meaningful access to the relevant benefit is prov~ded, and 
that whatever Davis or the Act may say about accommodations 
necessary to prov1de meaningful access, or even about 
accommodations beyond meaningful access, the Act simply does 
not, as the draft points out, contemplate the complete 
restructuring of a state benefit program that is urged by 
respondent. I am afraid that any attempt to go further and 
define when accommodations may be necessary causes problems 
because it gets too far removed from the facts of this case. 
Some specific requests in addition to the general: 
(1) In accordance with the above, could you omit 
footnote 22? As the footnote itself states, there is no 
need to get into that probl~m here. 
(2) On page 23, if the full paragraph above "Part IV" 
remains as is, could you change "situation" in the second 
sentence to "requirement"? I believe "requirement" more 
appropriately states what the sentence is about. 
(3) On page 6, the first full paragraph, second 
sentence, you state that Guardians suggests "at a minimum" 
that the regulations could make actionable the "disparate 
impact" here. I am not sure what you mean by "at a 
minimum," and I hope you could omit those three words. 
I realize that these suggestions, if adopted, would 
entail a major change in your discussion of the "reasonable 
accommodation" requirement of the statute, and might even, 
if acceptable to you, be unacceptable to one or more of 
those who have "joined" you. I am therefore sending copies 
of this letter to the conference: if you can see your way 




cc: The Conference 
•' 
.. tntt ClfO'nrl &tf tltt ~~ i'bdts 
Jra,.lfinghnt. ~. Clf. 2ll~Jl.~ 
ll 
CHAMBER S OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
,., 
December 17, 1~84 
Re: 83- 727 - Alexander v. Choate 
Dear Thurgood, 
I would hope that you will look with 




Copies to the Conference 
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aid would pay hospitals on behalf of a Medicaid recipient. 
Before the new measures took effect, respondents, Tennes-
see Medicaid recipients, brought a class action for declara-
tory and injunctive relief in which they alleged, inter alia, 
that the proposed 14-day limitation on inpatient coverage 
would have a discriminatory effect on the handicapped. 2 
Statistical evidence, which petitioner does not dispute, indi-
cated that in the 1979-1980 fiscal year, 27.4% of all handi-
capped users of hospital services who received Medicaid 
required more than 14 days of care, while only 7.8% of non-
handicapped users required more than 14 days of inpatient 
care. 
Based on this evidence, respondents asserted that the re-
duction would violate § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
29 U. S. C. § 794 (1982) and its implementing regulations. 
Section 504 provides that: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, 
solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance .... 
29 u. s. c. § 794 (1982). 
Respondents' position was twofold. First, they argued 
that the change from 20 to 14 days of coverage would have a 
disproportionate affect on the handicapped and hence was 
2 The State proposed an array of other changes in its Medicaid program. 
Although respondents challenged many of these other changes, settlement 
was reached on all the proposed changes other than the reduction in the 
number of inpatient days covered. Thus none of the other changes is be-
fore this Court. Respondents also asserted a number of causes of action 
other than their § 504 claim in their original and amended complaints. 
These additional legal theories are similarly not before the Court. 
Since the district court's decision, the state has amended its Medicaid 
program in two minor ways not materially significant to the issues pre-
sented on certiorari. 
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discriminatory.3 The second, and major, thrust of respond-
ents' attack was directed at the use of any annual limitation 
on the number of inpatient days covered, for respondents ac-
knowledged that, given the special needs of the handicapped 
for medical care, any such limitation was likely to disad-
vantage the handicapped disproportionately. Respondents 
noted, however, that federal law does not require states to 
impose any annual durational limitation on inpatient cover-
age, and that the Medicaid programs of only ten states im-
pose such restrictions. 4 Respondents therefore suggested 
that Tennessee follow the lead of other states and do away 
with any limitation on the number of annual inpatient days 
covered. Instead, argued respondents, the State could limit 
the L.umber of days of hospital coverage on a per-stay basis, 
with the number of covered days to vary depending on the 
recipient's illness (for example, fixing the number of days 
covered for an app~ndectomy); the period to be covered for 
each illness could then be set at a level that would keep Ten-
nessee's Medicaid program as a whole within its budget. 5 
The State's refusal to adopt this plan was said to result in the 
imposition of gratuitous costs on the handicapped and thus to 
constitute discrimination under §504. 
3 The evidence indicated that, if 19 days of coverage were provided, 
16.9% of the handicapped, as compared to 4.2% of the nonhandicapped, 
would not have their needs for inpatient care met. 
• As of 1980 the average ceiling in those states was 37.6 days. Six 
states also limit the number of reimbursable days per admission, per spell 
of illness, or per benefit period. See Brief for the United States App. B. 
6 See Jennings v. Alexander, 518 F . Supp. 877, 883, n. 7 (MD Tenn. 
1981). Respondents' diagnosis-related reimbursement proposal is . sup-
ported by a committee of the Tennessee legislature, which has recom-
mended that the state adopt such a plan. The Medicaid System of the 
Tennessee Department of Public Health , A Report of the Special Joint 
Committee to the Ninety-Third General Assembly, 24, 26 (1983). The 
Court of Appeals seems to have mischaracterized this proposal of respond-
ents as an attempt to limit "the total number of visits per annum rather 
than the number of days. " 715 F. 2d, at 1044. 
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A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that respondents had indeed established a prima 
facie case of a § 504 violation. The majority apparently con-
cluded that any action by a federal grantee that disparately 
affects the handicapped states a cause of action under § 504 
and its implementing regulations. Because both the 14-day 
rule and any annual limitation on inpatient coverage dispa-
rately affected the handicapped, the panel found that a prima 
facie case had been made out, and the case was remanded 6 to 
give Tennessee an opportunity for rebuttal. According to 
the panel majority, the State on remand could either demon-
strate the unavailability of alternative plans that would 
achieve -the State's legitimate cost-saving goals with a less 
disproportionate impact on the handicapped, or the State 
could offer "a substantial justification for the adoption of the 
plan with the greater discriminatory impact." Jennings v. 
Alexander, 715 F. 2d 1036, 1046 (CA6 1983). We granted 
certiorari to consider whether the type of impact at issue in 
this case is cognizable under § 504 or its implementing regula-
tions, and we now reverse. 
II 
The first question the parties urge on the Court is whether 
proof of discriminatory animus is always required to establish 
a violation of § 504 and its implementing regulations, or 
whether federal law also reaches action by a recipient of fed-
eral funding that discriminates against the handicapped by 
effect rather than by design. The State of Tennessee argues 
that § 504 reaches only purposeful discrimination against the 
handicapped. As support for this position, the State relies 
heavily on our recent decision in Guardians Association v. 
6 The District Court had dismissed respondents' complaint under Fed. 
R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) on the basis, inter alia, that the effect on the handi-
capped of the plan that included the 14-day limitation was "not the type of 
discrimination that§ 504 was intended to proscribe." Jennings v. Alexan-
der, 518 F. Supp. 877, 881 (MD Tenn. 1981). 
'· . ~
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Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 103 S. Ct. 
3221 (1983). 
In Guardians, we confronted the question whether Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, et 
seq., (1982), which prohibits discrimination against racial and 
ethnic minorities in programs receiving federal aid, reaches 
both intentional and disparate-impact discrimination. 7 No 
opinion commanded a majority in Guardians, and members 
of the Court offered widely varying interpretations of Title 
VI. Nonetheless, a two-pronged holding on the nature of 
the discrimination proscribed by Title VI emerged in that 
case. First, the Court held that Title VI itself directly 
reached · only instances of intentional discrimination. 8 Sec-
ond, the Court held that actions having an unjustifiable dis-
parate impact on minorities could be redressed through 
agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of 
Title VI. 9 In essence, then, we held that Title VI had dele-
7 Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, 
provides: 
"No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or na-
tional origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance." 
The premise of the State's reliance on Guardians is that § 504 was mod-
elled in part on Title VI, and that the evolution of Title VI regulatory and 
judicial law is therefore relevant to ascertaining the intended scope of 
§ 504. We agree with this basic premise. See S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd 
Cong., 2d Sess., 6390-91, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 
6373 ("Section 504 was patterned after and is almost identical to, the anti-
discrimination language of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U. S. C. 2000d-1 (relating to race, color, or national origin) and section 901 
of the Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U. S. C. 1683 (relating to sex)"). 
Nonetheless , as we point out infra, at-- and n. 13, too facile an assimila-
tion of Title VI law to § 504 must be resisted. 
8 103 S. Ct. at 3236-3237 (opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, in which THE 
CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined); id., at 3237 (opinion of 
JusTICE O'CONNOR); id., at 3249 (opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, in which 
JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACKMUN joined). 
9 103 S. Ct. , at 3232 (JUSTICE WHITE, announcing the judgment of the 
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gated to the agencies in the first instance the complex deter-
mination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities 
constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were 
readily enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices 
of the federal grantees that had produced those impacts. 
Guardians, therefore, does not support petitioner's blan-
ket proposition that federal law proscribes only intentional 
discrimination against the handicapped. Indeed, to the ex-
tent our holding in Guardians is relevant to the interpre-
tation of § 504, Guardians suggests that the regulations im- [ J 
plementing § 504, upon which respondents in part rely, could 
make actionable the disparate impact challenged in this 
case. 10 ·Moreover, there are reasons to pause before too 
quickly extending even the first prong of Guardians to § 504. 
Cf. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 
(1984) n. 13 (recognizing distinctions between Title VI and 
§ 504). 11 
Court); id., at 3244, n. 15 (opinion of JUSTICE MARSHALL); id., at 3249 
(opinion of JUSTICE STEVENS, in which JUSTICES BRENNAN and BLACK-
MUN joined). 
'
0 See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). We conclude infra, at --, that in this case the regulations do not 
in fact support respondents' action. 
11 In addition to the nature of the problems with which the § 504 Con-
gress was concerned, see infra, at --, at least two other considerations 
counsel hesitation before reading Title VI and § 504 in pari materia with 
respect to the effect/intent issue. First, for seven Justices, the outcome in 
the first prong of Guardians was settled by their view that a majority of 
the Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 
265 (1978) had already concluded that Title VI reached only intentional dis-
crimination. See 103 S. Ct., at 3236 (opinion of JUSTICE POWELL, in which 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined); id., at 3237 (opinion 
of JUSTICE O'CONNOR); id. at 3253, and n. 12 (opinion of STEVENS, BREN-
NAN, and BLACKMUN, JJ., dissenting). Although two of the five Justices 
who were said to have reached such a conclusion in Bakke wrote in Guard-
ians to reject this interpretation of Bakke, see 103 S. Ct., at 3225-3226, 
and n. 11 (WHITE, J., announcing the judgment of the Court); id., at 
3240-3241 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), in the view of the seven Justices 
Bakke controlled as a matter of stare decisis. Had these Justices not felt 
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Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by 
Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious ani-
mus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference-of be-
nign neglect. 12 Thus, Representative Vanik, introducing the 
predecessor to § 504 in the House, 13 described the treatment 
the force of this constraint, it is unclear whether they would have read an 
intent requirement into Title VI. See id., at 3237 (O'CONNOR, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) ("Were we construing Title VI without the benefit of 
any prior interpretation from this Court, one might well conclude that the 
staute was designed to redress more than purposeful discrimination") (cita-
tion omitted). For that reason, the conclusion that, in response to factors 
peculiar to Title VI, Bakke locked in a certain construction of Title VI 
would not seem to have any obvious or direct applicability to § 504. 
Second, by the time Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act in 1973, 
nearly a decade of experience had been accumulated with the operation of 
the nondiscrimination provisions of Titles VI and VII. By this time, 
model Title VI enforcement regulations incorporating a disparate impact 
standard had been drafted by a presidential task force and the Justice De-
partment, and every Cabinet department and about forty federal agencies 
had adopted standards in which Title VI was interpreted to bar programs 
with a discriminatory impact. See Guardians, 103 S. Ct., at 3240-3241 
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting). These regulations provoked some contro-
versy in Congress, and in 1966 the House of Representatives rejected a 
proposed amendment that would have limited Title VI to only intentional 
discrimination. Id., at 3241-3242. Thus, when Congress in 1973 adopted 
virtually the same language for§ 504 that had been used in Title VI, Con-
gress was well aware of the intent/impact issue and of the fact that similar 
language in Title VI consistently had been interpreted to reach disparate 
impact discrimination. In refusing expressly to limit § 504 to intentional 
discrimination, Congress could be thought to have approved a disparate 
impact standard for § 504. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U. S. 
544, 554 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 698-699 
(1979). 
12 To be sure, well-catalogued instances of invidious discrimination 
against the handicapped do exist. See, e. g., United States Commission 
on Civil Rights: Accommodating The Spectrum of Individual Abilities, 
Ch. 2 (1983); Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered: Ensur-
ing Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 410, 403, n. 2 (1984). 
13 Although § 504 ultimately was passed as part of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973, the nondiscrimination principle later codified in § 504 was initially 
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of the handicapped as one of the country's "shameful over-
sights," which caused the handicapped to live among society 
"shunted aside, hidden, and 'ignored." 117 Cong. Rec. 45974 
(1971). Similarly, Senator Humphrey, who introduced a 
companion measure in the Senate, asserted that "we can no 
longer tolerate the invisibility of the handicapped in America 
.... " 118 Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972). And Senator Cran-
ston, the acting chairman of the subcommittee that drafted 
§ 504, 14 described the Act as a response to "previous societal 
neglect." 119 Cong. Rec. 5880, 5883 (1973). See also 118 
Cong. Rec. 526 (1972) (statement of co-sponsor Sen. Percy) 
(describing the legislation leading to the 1973 Act as a na-
tional committment to eliminate the "glaring neglect" of the 
handicapped). 15 Federal agencies and commentators on the 
plight of the handicapped similarly have found that dis-
crimination against the handicapped is primarily the result of 
apathetic attitudes rather than affirmative animus. 16 
proposed as an amendment to Title VI. This proposal was first introduced 
by Representative Yanik in the House. See H. R. 14033, 92d Gong., 2d 
Sess., 118 Gong. Rec. 9712 (1972); H. R. 12154, 92d Gong., 1st Sess., 117 
Gong. Rec. 45945 (1971). A companion measure was introduced in the 
Senate by Senators Humphrey and Percy. See S. 3044; 118 Gong. Rec. 
525-526 (1972). The principle underlying these bills was reshaped in the 
next Congress and inserted as § 504 into major vocational rehabilitation 
legislation then pending. Senator Humphrey and Representative Yanik 
indicated that the intent of the original bill had been carried forward into 
§ 504. See 119 Gong. Rec. 6145 (1973) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 118 
Gong. Rec. 32310 (1972) (same); 119 Gong. Rec. 7114 (1973) (statement of 
Rep. Yanik). Given the lack of debate devoted to § 504 in either the 
House or Senate when the Rehabilitation Act was passed in 1973, see 
R. Cappalli, Federal Grants and Cooperative Agencies, § 20:03 (1982), the 
intent with which Congressman Yanik and Senator Humphrey crafted the 
predecessor to § 504 is a primary signpost on the road toward interpreting 
the legislative history of § 504. 
14 118 Gong. Rec. 30680 (1972) (statement of Sen. Randolph describing 
origins of § 504). 
16 Senator Percy was both a co-sponsor of the predecessor to § 504 and of 
the Senate version of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
'
6 See, e. g., United States Comm. on Civil Rights, Accommodating the 
Spectrum of Individual Abilities at 17 (1983); Note, Accommodating the 
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In addition, much of the conduct that Congress sought to 
alter in passing the Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if 
not impossible to reach were the Act construed to proscribe 
only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent. For exam-
ple, elimination of architectural barriers was one of the cen-
tral aims of the Act, see, e. g., S. Rep. No. 93-318, 93rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1973), yet such barriers were clearly not 
erected with the aim or intent of excluding the handicapped. 
Similarly, Senator Williams, the chairman of the Labor and 
Public Welfare Committee that reported out § 504, asserted 
that the handicapped were the victims of "[d]iscrimination in 
access t9 public transportion" and "[d]iscrimination because 
they do not have the simplest forms of special services they 
need .... " 118 Cong. Rec. 3320 (1972). And Senator 
Humphrey, again in introducing the proposal that }ater be-
came § 504, listed, among the instances of discrimination that 
the secti.on would pro~bit, the use of "transportation and 
architectual barriers," the "discriminatory effect of job quali-
fication ... procedures," and the denial of "special educa-
tional assistance" for handicapped children. 118 Cong. Rec. 
525-526 (1972). These statements would ring hollow if the 
resulting legislation could not rectify the harms resulting 
from action that discriminated by effect as well as by design. 17 
Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act, 55 N. Y. U. L. R. 881, 883 (1980). 
17 All the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue have agreed 
that, at least under some circumstances, § 504 reaches disparate-impact 
discrimination. See, e. g. , New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. 
New Mexico, 678 F. 2d 847, 854 (CAlO 1982); Pushkin v. Regents of Uni-
versity of Colorado, 658 F. 2d 1372, 1384-1385 (CAlO 1981); Dopico v. 
Goldschmidt, 687 F. 2d 644, 652-653 (CA2 1982); NAACP v. Wilmington 
Medical Center, 657 F. 2d 1322, 1331 (CA3 1981) (en bane); Majors v. 
Housing Authority of the County of DeKalb Georgia, 652 F. 2d 454, 
457-458 (CA5 1981); Jones v. Illinois Dept. of Rehabilitation Services, 689 
F . 2d 724 (CA71982); Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F. 2d 666 (CA111983); Geor-
gia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F. 2d 1565, 1578-1580 
(CAll 1983), vacated for further consideration in light of Smith v. Robin-
son, (104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984)), 104 S. Ct. 3581 (1984); see also Joyner by 
Lowry v. Dumpson, 712 F . 2d 770, 775-76, and n. 7 (CA2 1983) (rejecting 
83-727-0PINION 
10 ALEXANDERuCHOATE 
At the same time, the position urged by respondents-that 
we interpret § 504 to reach all action disparately affecting the 
handicapped-is also troubling. Because the handicapped 
typically are not similarly situated to the nonhandicapped, 
respondents' position would in essence require each recipient 
of federal funds first to evaluate the effect on the handi-
capped of every proposed action that might touch the inter-
ests of the handicapped, and then to consider alternatives for 
achieving the same objectives with less severe disadvantage 
to the handicapped. The formalization and policing of this 
process could lead to a wholly unwieldy adminstrative and 
adjudicative burden. See Note, Employment Discrimina-
tion Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 Harv. 
L. Rev. 997, 1008 (1984) (describing problems with pure dis-
parate impact model in context of employment discrimination 
against the handicapped). Had Congress intended § 504 to 
be a National Environmental Policy Act 18 for the handi-
capped, requiring the preparation of "Handicapped Impact 
use of "adverse impact" theory as grounds for challenging state statute 
that requires parents who desire special state-subsidized residential child 
care services for handicapped children to transfer temporary custody of 
their children to state, but reserving question of whether that test might 
be used in employment discrimination actions). 
At least 24 federal agencies have reached the same conclusion. See 5 
CFR 900. 704(b)(3) (OPM); 7 CFR 15b.4(b)(4)(DOA); 10 CFR 4.121(b)(4) 
(NRC); 10 CFR 1040.63(b)(4) (DOE); 14 CFR 1251.103(b)(5) (NASA); 15 
CFR 8b.4(b)(4) (DOC); 18 CFR 1307.4(b)(3) (TVA); 22 CFR 142.4(b)(4) 
(DOS); 22 CFR 217.4(b)(4) (AID/IDCA); 28 CFR 41.51(b)(3), 42.503(b)(3) 
(DOJ); 29 CFR 32.4(b)(4)(DOL); 31 CFR 51.52(b)(l)(vi), 51.55(b)(l) (viii) 
(D. Treas. (ORS)); 32 CFR56.8(a)(6) (DOD); 34 CFR 104.4(b)(4) (D. Ed.); 
38 CFR18.404(b)(4) (VA); 49 Fed. Reg. 1656 (1984) (to be condified at 40 
CFR Pt. 7) (EPA); 41 CFR 101-8.303(d) (GSA); 43 CFR17.203(b)(4) (DOl); 
45 CFR 84.4(b)(4) (HHS); 45 CFR 605.4(b)(4) (NSF); 45 CFR 1151.17(c) 
(NEA); 45 CFR 1170.12(c) (NEH); 45 CFR 1232.4(b)(3) (ACTION); 49 
CFR 27. 7(b)(4) (DOT). We are unaware of any case challenging the facial 
validity of these regulations. 
18





Statements" before any action was taken by a grantee that 
affected the handicapped, we would expect some indication of 
that purpose in the statute or its legislative history. Yet 
there is nothing to suggest that such was Congress' purpose. 
Thus, just as there is reason to question whether Congress 
intended § 504 to reach only intentional discrimination, there 
is similarly reason to question whether Congress intended 
§ 504 to embrace all claims of disparate-impact discrimi-
nation. 
Any interpretation of § 504 must therefore be responsive to 
two powerful but countervailing considerations-the need to 
give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep 
§ 504 within manageable bounds. Given the legitimacy of 
both of these goals and the tension between them, we decline 
the parties' invitation to decide today that one of these goals 
so overshadows the other as to eclipse it. While we ·reject 
the boundless notion that all disparate-impact showings con-
stitute prima facie cases under § 504, we assume without 
deciding that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that has an 
unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped. On 
that assumption, we must then determine whether the dis-
parate effect of which respondents complain is th~ sort of dis-
parate impact that federal law might recognize. 
III 
To determine which disparate impacts § 504 might make 
actionable, the proper starting point is Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis, 442 U. S. 397 (1979), our major pre-
vious attempt to define the scope of§ 504. 19 Davis involved a 
plaintiff with a major hearing disability who sought admission 
'
9 Davis addressed that portion of § 504 which requires that a handi-
capped individual be "otherwise qualified" before the nondiscrimination 
principle of§ 504 becomes relevant. However, the question of who is "oth-
erwise qualified" and what actions constitute "discrimination" under the 
Section would seem to be two sides of a single coin; the ultimate question is 
the extent to which a grantee is required to make reasonable modifications 
in its programs for the needs of the handicapped. 
83-727-0PINION 
12 ALEXANDER~ CHOATE 
to a college to be trained as a registered nurse, but who 
would not be capable of safely performing as a registered 
nurse even with full time personal supervision. We stated 
that, under some circumstances, a "refusal to modify an ex-
isting program might become unreasonable and discrimina-
tory. Identification of those instances where a refusal to 
accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to dis-
crimination against the handicapped [is] an important respon-
sibility of HEW." 442 U. 8., at 412-413. We held that the 
college was not required to admit Davis because it appeared 
unlikely that she could benefit from any modifications that 
the relevant HEW regulations required, id., at 409, and 
because the further modifications Davis sought-full-time, 
personar supervision whenever she attended patients and 
elimination of all clinical courses-would have compromised 
the essential nature of the college's nursing program, id., at 
413-414. Such a "fundamental alteration in the nature of a 
program" was far more than the reasonable modifications the 
statute or regulations required. I d., at 410. Davis thus 
struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handi-
capped to be integrated into society and the legitimate inter-
ests of federal grantees in preserving the integrity of their 
programs: while a grantee need not be required to make "fun-
damental" or "substantial" modifications to accommodate the 
handicapped, it may be required to make "reasonable" ones. 
Compare 442 U. S., at 410 with id., at 412-413. 20 
20 In Davis, we stated that § 504 does not impose an "affirmative-action 
obligation on all recipients of federal funds." 442 U. S., at 411. Our use 
of the term affirmative action in this context has been severely criticized 
for failing to appreciate the difference between affirmative action and rea-
sonable accommodation; the former is said to refer to a remedial policy for 
the victims of past discrimination, while the latter relates to the elimina-
tion of existing obstacles against the handicapped. See Note, Accommo-
dating the Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act, 55 N. Y. U. L. R. 881, 885-86 (1980); Note, 
Accommodating the Handicapped: Rehabilitating Section 504 After South-
eastern, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 171, 185-86 (1980); see also Dopico v. Gold-
-
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The balance struck in Davis requires that an otherwise 
qualified handicapped individual must be provided with 
meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers. 
The benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that 
effectively denies otherwise qualified handicapped individ-
uals the meaningful access to which they are entitled; to as-
sure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the 
grantee's program or benefit may have to be made. 21 In this 
case, respondents argue that the 14-day rule, or any annual 
schmidt, 687 F. 2d 644, 652 (CA2 1982) ("Use of the phrase 'affinnative 
action' in this context is unfortunate, making it difficult to talk about any 
kind of affinnative efforts without importing the special legal and social 
connotations of that term."). Regardless of the aptness of our choice of 
words in Davis, it is clear from the context of Davis that the term affirma-
tive action referred to those "changes," "adjustments," or "modifications" 
to existing programs that would' be "substantial," 442 U. S., at 410, 411, 
n. 10, 413, or that would constitute "fundamental alteration[s] in the na-
ture of a program ... , "id., at 410, rather than to those changes that would 
be reasonable accommodations. 
21 As the Solicitor General states, "Antidiscrimination legislation can ob-
viously be emptied of meaning if every discriminatory policy is 'collapsed' 
into one's definition of what is the relevant benefit." Brief for the United 
States As Amicus Curiae. at 29, n. 36. At oral argument, the government 
also acknowledged that "special measures for the handicapped, as the Lau 
case shows, may sometimes be necessary ... .'' Tr. of Oral Arg. 14-15 
(referring to Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974)). 
The regulations implementing § 504 are consistent with the view that 
reasonable adjustments in the nature of the benefit offered must at times \ 
be made to assure meaningful access. See, e. g., 45 CFR § 84.12(a) (1983) 
(requiring an employer to make "reasonable accommodations to the known 
physical or mental limitations" of a handicapped individual); 45 CFR § 84.22 
and § 84.23 (1983) (requiring that new buildings be readily accessible, 
building alterations be accessible "to the maximum extent feasible," and 
existing facilities eventually be operated so that a program or activity in-
side is, "when viewed in its entirety," readily accessible); 45 CFR § 84.44(a) 
(requiring certain modifications to the regular academic programs of sec-
ondary education institutions, such as changes in the length of time permit-
ted for the completion of degree requirements, substitution of specific 
courses required for the completion of degree requirments, and adaptation 
of the manner in which specific courses are conducted). 
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durational limitation, denies meaningful access to Medicaid J 
services in Tennessee. We examine each of these arguments 
in turn. 
A 
The 14-day limitation will not deny respondents meaningful 
access to Tennessee Medicaid services or exclude them from 
those services. The new limitation does not invoke criteria 
that have a particular exclusionary effect on the handicapped; 
the reduction, neutral on its face, does not distinguish be-
tween those whose coverage will be reduced and those whose 
coverage will not on the basis of any test, judgment, or trait 
that the handicapped as a class are less capable of meeting or 
less likely of having. Moreover, it cannot be argued that 
"meaningful access" to State Medicaid services will be denied 
by the 14-day limitation on inpatient coverage; nothing in the 
record suggests that the handicapped in Tennessee will be 
unable to benefit meaningfully from the coverage they will 
receive under the 14-day rule. 22 The reduction in inpatient 
coverage will leave both handicapped and nonhandicapped 
Medicaid users with identical and effective hospital services 
fully available for their use, with both classes of users subject 
to the same durational limitation. The 14-day limitation, 
therefore, does not exclude the handicapped from or deny 
them the benefits of the 14 days of care the State has chosen 
to provide. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535 (1972). 
To the extent respondents further suggest that their 
greater need for prolonged inpatient care means that, to pro-
vide meaningful access to Medicaid services, Tennessee must 
single out the handicapped for more than 14 days of coverage, 
the suggestion is simply unsound. At base, such a sugges-
22 The record does not contain any suggestion that the illnesses uniquely 
associated with the handicapped or occurring with greater frequency 
among them cannot be effectively treated, at least in part, with fewer than 
14 days coverage. In addition, the durationallimitation does not apply to 
only particular handicapped conditions and takes effect regardless of the 
particular cause of hospitalization. 
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tion must rest on the notion that the benefit provided 
through state Medicaid programs is the amorphous objective 
of "adequate health care." But Medicaid programs do not 
guarantee that each recipient will receive that level of health 
care precisely tailored to his or her particular needs. In-
stead, the benefit provided through Medicaid is a particular 
package of health care services, such as 14 days of inpatient 
coverage. That package of services has the general aim of 
assuring that individuals will receive necessary medical care, 
but the benefit provided remains the individual services of-
fered-not "adequate health care." 
The federal Medicaid Act makes this point clear. The Act 
gives the states substantial discretion to choose the proper 
mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on coverage, 
as long as care and services are provided in "the best inter-
ests of the recipients." 42 U. S. C. § 1396a(a)(19). The Dis-
trict Court found that the 14-day limitation would fully serve 
95% of even handicapped individuals eligible for Tennessee 
Medicaid, and both lower courts concluded that Tennessee's 
proposed Medicaid plan would meet the "best interests" 
standard. That unchallenged conclusion 23 indicates that 
Tennessee is free, as a matter of the Medicaid Act, to choose 
to define the benefit it will be providing as 14 days of in-
patient coverage. 
Section 504 does not require the State to alter this defini-
tion of the benefit being offered simply to meet the reality 
that the handicapped have greater medical needs. To con-
clude otherwise would be to find that the Rehabilitation Act 
requires States to view certain illnessess, i. e., those particu-
larly affecting the handicapped, as more important than oth-
23 Because that conclusion is unchallenged, we express no opinion on 
whether annual limits on hospital care are in fact consistent with the Med-
icaid Act. See, e. g., Charleston Memorial Hospital v. Conrad, 693 F. 2d 
324, 329-330 (CA4 1982) (upholding 12 day a year limitation on inpatient 
hospital coverage); Virginia Hospital Ass'n v. Kenley, 427 F. Supp. 781 
(ED Va. 1977) (upholding 21-day limitation). 
. ' ' 
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ers and more worthy of cure through government subsidiza-
tion. Nothing in the legislative history of the Act supports 
such a conclusion. Cf. Doe v. Coulotti, 592 F. 2d 704 (CA3 
1979) (state may limit covered private inpatient pyschiatric 
care to 60 days even though state sets no limit on duration of 
coverage for physical illnesses). Section 504 seeks to assure 
evenhanded treatment and the opportunity for handicapped 
individuals to participate in and benefit from programs re-
ceiving federal assistance. Davis, supra. The Act does 
not, however; guarantee the handicapped equal results from 
the provision of state Medicaid, even assuming some measure 
of equality of health could be constructed. Ibid. 
Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) pursuant to the Act further support 
this conclusion. 24 These regulations state that recipients of 
federal funds who provide health services cannot "provide a 
qualified handicapped person with benefits or services that 
are not as effective (as defined in § 84A(b)) as the benefits or 
services provided to others." 45 CFR § 84.52(a)(3). The 
regulations also prohibit a recipient of federal funding from 
adopting "criteria or methods of administration that have the 
purpose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing 
accomplishment of the objectives of the recipient's program 
u We have previously recognized these regulations as an important 
source of guidance on the meaning of§ 504. See Consolidated Rail Corp. 
v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248 (1984) (holding that 1978 Amendments to the 
Act were intended to codify the regulations enforcing § 504); Southeastern 
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S., at 413 ("Identification of those in-
stances where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person 
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped person continues to be 
an important responsibility of HEW"); see generally Guardians Associa-
tion v. Civil Service Commission of New York, 103 S. Ct. 3221 (1983). 
1974 Amendments to the Act clarified the scope of§ 504 by making clear 
that those charged with administering the Act had substantial leeway to 
explore areas in which discrimination against the handicapped posed par-
ticularly significant problems and to devise regulations to prohibit such dis-
crimination. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 93-1297, at 40-41, 56 (1974) . 
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with respect to the handicapped." 45 C. F. R. § 84.4(b)(4)(ii) 
(1983). 25 
While these regulations, read in isolation, could be taken to 
suggest that a State medicaid program must make the handi-
capped as healthy as the nonhandicapped, other regulations 
reveal that HHS does not contemplate imposing such a re-
quirement. 45 CFR § 84.4(b), referred to in the regulations 
quoted above, makes clear that: 
"For purposes of this part, aids, benefits, and services, 
to be equally effective, are not required to produce the 
identical result or level of achievement for handicapped 
and nonhandicapped persons, but must afford handi-
capped persons equal opportunity to obtain the same re-
sult, to gain the same benefit or to reach the same level 
of achievement . . . . " 
45 CFR 84.4(b)(2). 
This regulation, while indicating that adjustments to exist-
ing programs are contemplated, 26 also makes clear that Ten-
nessee is not required to assure that its handicapped Medic-
25 Respondents also rely on a variety of other regulations. See, e. g., 45 
CFR § 84.52(a)(2) (stating that a recipient who provides health services 
cannot "[a]fford a qualified handicapped person an opportunity to receive 
benefits or services that is not equal to that offered nonhandicapped per-
sons"); 45 CFR § 84.4 (b)(1)(iii) (prohibiting a recipient of federal funds 
from providing "a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit, or 
service that is not as effective as that provided to others"); 45 CFR 
§ 84.4(b)(1)(ii) (stating that a recipient cannot "[a]fford a qualified handi-
capped person an opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, ben-
efit, or service that is not equal to that afforded others"). 
26 The interpretive analysis accompanying these regulations states: 
"[T]he term 'equally effective,' defined in paragraph (b)(2), is intended to 
encompass the concept of equivalent, as opposed to identical, services and 
to acknowledge the fact that in order to meet the individual needs of handi-
capped persons to the same extent that the corresponding needs of non-
handicapped persons are met, adjustments to regular programs or the pro-
vision of different programs may sometimes be necessary." 
45 CFR Pt. 84 App. A. ~ 6 (1983). 
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aid users will be as healthy as its nonhandicapped users. 
Thus, to the extent respondents are seeking a distinct 
durational limitation for the handicapped, Tennessee is enti-
tled to respond by asserting that the relevant benefit is 14 
days of coverage. Because the handicapped have meaning-
ful and equal access to that benefit, Tennessee is not obli-
gated to reinstate its 20-day rule or to provide the handi-
capped with more than 14 days of inpatient coverage. 
B 
We turn next to respondents' alternative contention, a con-
tention directed not at the 14-day rule itself but rather at 
Tennessee's Medicaid plan as a whole. Respondents argue 
that the · inclusion of any annual durational limitation on in-
patient coverage in a State Medicaid plan violates § 504. The 
thrust of this challenge is that all annual durational limita-
tions discriminate against the handicapped because (1) the 
effect of such limitations falls most heavily on the handi-
capped and because (2) this harm could be avoided by the 
choice of other Medicaid plans that would meet the State's 
budgetary constraints without disproportionately disad-
vantaging the handicapped. Viewed in this light, Tennes-
see's current plan is said to inflict a gratuitous harm on the 
handicapped that denies them meaningful access to medicaid 
services. 
Whatever the merits of this conception of meaningful ac-
cess, it is clear that § 504 does not require the changes re-
spondents seek. In enacting the Rehabilitation Act and in 
subsequent amendments, 27 Congress did focus on several sub-
t7 The year after the Rehabilitation Act was passed, Congress returned 
to it with important amendments that clarified the scope of § 504. . See 
Pub. L. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). While these amendments and their 
history cannot substitute for a clear expression of legislative intent at the 
time of enactment, Davis, 442 U. S., at 411, n. 11, as virtually contempora-
neous and more specific elaborations of the general norm that Congress 
had enacted into law the previous year, the amendments and their history 
do shed significant light on the intent with which § 504 was enacted. See, 
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stantive areas-employment, 28 education, 29 and the elimina-
tion of physical barriers to access30-in which it considered 
the societal and personal costs of refusals to provide mean- \ 
ingful access to the handicapped to be particularly high. 31 
But nothing in the pre- or post-1973 legislative discussion of 
§ 504 suggests that Congress desired to make major inroads 
on the States' long-standing discretion to choose the proper 
mix of amount, scope, and duration limitations on services 
covered by state Medicaid, see Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
444 (1977). And, more generally, we have already stated, \ 
supra, at --, that § 504 does not impose a general NEPA-
like requirement on federal grantees. 32 
e. g., Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666-671 (1979); Seatrain 
Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U. S. 572, 596 (1979). Congress 
again amended Title V of the Rehabilitation Act in 1978, in the process in-
corporating the enforcement mechanisms available under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Pub. L. 95-602, § 505(a)(2), 29 U. S. C. 
§ 794a 91982). We have previously relied on the post-1973 legislative ac-
tions to interpret § 504. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 
1248, 1253-1254 (1984). 
28 "The primary goal of the Act is to increase employment." Consoli-
dated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S. Ct. 1248, 1254, n. 13 (1984). See also 
29 U. S. C. § 701 (11) (1976 ed.). 
29 See, e. g., 117 Cong. Rec. 45,974 (1971) (statement of Rep. Yanik); 118 
Cong. Rec. 525-526 (1972) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 119 Cong. Rec. 
5882-5883 (1973) (statement of Sen. Cranston); 118 Cong. Rec. 3320- 3322 
(1972) (statement of Sen. Williams). 
30 See, e. g. , 29 U. S. C. § 701 (11) (1976 ed.); S. Rep. No. 93-318, 93rd 
Cong., 1st Sess. , 4 (1973); S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong. , 2d Sess. 50 (1974). 
31 Rehabilitation training, of course, was also central to the purposes of 
the 1973 Act, and such training might involve issues concerning specific 
health care benefits. In this case, however, respondents have never as-
serted that the 14-day rule has any effect at all on rehabilitation programs. 
32 Assuming arguendo that agency regulations may impose such a re-
quirement in specific areas to further the purposes of§ 504, see Guardians , 
supra; Lau v. N ichols , supra, the current regulations are drafted in far too 
broad terms to permit the conclusion that state Medicaid programs must 
always choose, from among various otherwise legitimate benefit and serv-
ice options, the particular option most favorable , or least disadvantageous, 
to the handicapped. Before we would find these that these generally-
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The costs of such a requirement would be far from minimal, I 
and thus Tennessee's refusal to pursue this course does not, 
as respondents suggest, inflict a "gratuitous" harm on the 
handicapped. On the contrary, to require that the sort of 
broad-based distributive decision at issue in this case always 
be made in the way most favorable, or least disadvantageous1 
to the handicapped, even when the same benefit is meaning-
fully and equally·offered to them, would be to impose a virtu-
ally unworkable requirement on State Medicaid adminis-
trators. Before taking any across-the-board action affecting 
Medicaid recipients, an analysis of the effect of the proposed 
change on the handicapped would have to be prepared. Pre-
sumably, that analysis would have to be further broken down 
by class of handicap-the change at issue here, for example, 
might be significantly less harmful to the blind, who use inpa-
tient services only minimally, than to other sub-classes of 
handicapped Medicaid recipients; the State would then have 
to balance the harms and benefits to various groups to deter-
mine, on balance, the extent to which the action disparately 
impacts the handicapped. In addition, respondents offer no 
reason that similar treatment would not have to be accorded 
other groups protected by statute or regulation from dispar-
ate-impact discrimination. 
It should be obvious that administrative costs of imple-
menting such a regime would be well beyond the accommoda-
tions that are required under Davis. As a result, Tennessee 
need not redefine its Medicaid program to eliminate 
durationallimitations on inpatient coverage, even if in doing 
worded regulations were intended to limit a State's long-standing discre-
tion to set otherwise reasonable Medicaid coverage rules, that intent would 
have to be indicated with greater specificity in the regulations themselves 
or through other agency action. 
The Solicitor General agrees that the current regulations are not in-
tended to impose a NEPA-like requirement on State Medicaid 
Administrators. 
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so the State could achieve its immediate fiscal objectives in a 
way less harmful to the handicapped. 
IV 
The 14-day rule challenged in this case is neutral on its 
face, is not alleged to rest on a discriminatory motive, and 
does not deny the handicapped access to or exclude them 
from the particular package of Medicaid services Tennessee 
has chosen to provide. The State has made the same bene-
fit-14 days of coverage-equally accessible to both handi-
capped and nonhandicapped persons, and the State is not 
required to assure the handicapped "adequate health care" by 
providing them with more coverage than the nonhandi-
capped. In addition, the State is not obligated to modify its 
Medicaid program by abandoning reliance on annual dura-
tiona! limitations on inpatient coverage. Assuming, then, [ J 
that § 504 or its implementing regulations reach some claims 
of disparate-impact discrimination, the effect of Tennessee's 
reduction in annual inpatient coverage is not among them. 
For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
respondents had established a prima facie violation of § 504. 
The judgment below is accordingly reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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